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This paper  -a  product of the Transport Division, Transportation,  Water, and Urban Development
Department -was  prepared in the course of the department's efforts to monitor developments  in
intemational  freight  markets  and the  transport  industries  that serve  them, as a basis  for advising  the Bank
groups' operational  units about  policy  implications.  Copies  of the paper  are available  free  from the World
Bank, 1818  H Street  NW, Washington,  DC  20433. Please  contact  Joanne Lucas-Walker,  room S10-022,
extension  31078  (April 1993,  49 pages).
Until 1980,  the world  merchant  fleet expanded  have reached  alarming  levels.  The deteriorating
rapidly  in response  to thriving seatrade  markets.  safety  record  has caused  insurance  costs to
Since  then, it has not grown  much.  The industry  escalate  and has provoked  calls for stricter
did not adjust  effectively  to periodic  global  liability rules, stringent  technical  standards,  and
recession,  and the fleet's earnings  deteriorated  as  rigorous  inspection.  Enforcement  would  make
the gap widened  between  the supply  of tonnage  ocean transport  more  expensive.
and the demand for transport
To meet expected  demand  for ocean
The unpredictability  of seatrade  markets  and  transport  safely and efficiently,  a great deal of
the changing  snicture of demand  for ocean  overaged  tonnage  must be replaced,  maintenance
transport  complicated  shipowners'  efforts  to  must be improved,  and new tonnage  has to be
retrence  and draw up defensive  strategies.  added.  The estimated  cost: almost  US$400
Advances  in ship design and ocean  transport  billion  in constant 1992  prices.
technologies  allowed  shipowners  to adjust  to the
greater need for specialized  vessels,  but chose  to  But traditional  financing,  through  mortgage
retain their assets and their adoption  was  lending  and govemment  subsidy,  is becoming
expensive.  scarce.  Leasing  or cashflow-based  lending  are
promising  altematives,  but they require
Most shipowners  added only a few new  predictable  revenue  streams  based on long-term
vessels  after 1980,  often supported  by  freight  contracts  predicated  on cargo-owners'
government  subsidies.  Government  regulations  cooperation,  which remains  doubtful.
created serious  distortions  in ocean  transport  and
impeded  free market adjustments.  No effective  arrangements  have been  made
to meet the industry's capital requirements,  and
The most serious  issues  the industry  faces  doubts are more  numerous  than assurances  in the
are a critically  overaged  fleet and shortage  of  industry.
capital.  Because  of reduced  freight  earnings,
maintenance  has been neglected,  leading  to  The crisis that has developed  is
frequent  structural  failure. Ship casualties  - unprecedented.
often with serious  environmental  damage  -
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GLOSSARY  OF MARITIME  TERMS
Baltic Freight  Index (BFI) - The BFI shows  the weighted  average  freight rate level and weighted  average
trip time charter hire level on a 3pecific  day of the dry bulk cargo shipping market.  It is centered on
thirteen frequently fixed and settled worldwide  voyages on selected routes.  The BFI is traded on the
Baltic International  F, ight Futures Market (BIFFEX)  for specified future settlement  months--up  to two
years ahead--by  open negotiation. The price being  quoted  for each contract  month  will  constantly  change
in line with supply and demand in the market.  Hence the (price) indicators will reflect the views of
investors in the market as to what the settlement  price for the futures contract will be and, thereby, what
the level of the physical shipping  market will be at the time.
Bareboat Charter - A contract under which a shipowner  provides a vessel to a charter party.  Under
this form of chartering  the shipowner  virtually  relinquishes  all responsibilities  and rights in respect  of his
vessel for a specified  period of time, in return  for a pre-arranged,  regular payment  of hire. The charterer
becomes a disponent  owner, operating, crewing,  and chartering  the ship as though he were the owner.
Bulk Carriers/Bulker/Dry  Bulk Ships/Dry  Bulkers - All these  references  denote  vessels  that range in size
from small coastal craft to ships  of over 150,000  deadweight  capacity  which are designed  for the carriage
of oulk commodities,  like grain, ores, or fertilizers.
Bunker - Ships propulsior fuel
Classification  Societies - Independent,  non-profit  making  bodies which are directed  by committees  of
persons representing shipowners,  shipbuilders,  engine manufacturers,  and underwriters. They exist for
the purpose of ensuring that ships are properly constructed and maintained in a seaworthy and safe
condition.  To  fulfill this  function, the  mc:,  established societies make rules  governing vessel
construction, arrange and carry out surveys during the construction of a  vessel and throughout its
subsequent  trading life.  They also conduct  research covering  construction,  efficiency  and safety of sea-
going vessels.
Combination  Carriers - Ships designed  to carry either oil or other cargo, normally not concurrently.
They include  Ore/Oilers  (0/0),  Ore/Bulk/Oilers  (OBO),  Oil Products/Bulk/Crude  Oil carriers (PROBO),
and tankers wLch can also load a limited  number of containers.
Conferences - Organizations  whereby  a number  of shipowners,  often of different nationality,  offer their
services on given sea routes on conditions  agreed by the members.
Container  Ships - Vessels  designed  to carry full loads of containers  in fixed  cell guides. Containers  are
frequently  carried on deck where they require to be lashed  and secured. The carrying capacity of these
ships is specified in TEU, and may range from 300 to 500 TEU for feederships  to 4,500 TEU for the
most modern deep-sea  linehaul  units.- 6  -
Cross Trade - A shipping  service operated  between  two seaboard  countries by an ocean carrier whose
fleet does not fly either of the national  flags and therefore is a foreign or third party operator.
Deadweight Tonnage (dwt)  - The weight of cargo, watcr, bunkers, and constant-weights  (a fixed
allowance  for stores, spare parts, and the crew's effects)  that may be carried when a vessel is down to
its load-line  mark.  Since the load-line  varies, depending whether  the ship is in a winter, summer, or
tropical zone, it is important to specify to which condition t ie figure applies, although it is normal
practice to utilize summer deadweight  when describing  deadweight  tonnage.
General Cargo Ships - Most vessels  under this category in today's market are tweendeckers,  i.e. ships
with two or mole decks because  of the number  of ports served and the range of products carried.  With
the main engine located  in the aft  and thus avoiding  the necessity  of a shaft tunnel, the cargo spaces tend
to be box-shaped  to assist the stowing ot containers. 5oxed and palletized  cargo, whilst on deck most
designs allow for storage of containers. This vessel category is the most versati;e in the merchant fleet
as individual  units can also carry bulk cargo.
Gross  Registered Tons/Tonnage  (grt/gt)  - The total of all the enclosed  spaces within a ship, expressed
in tons, each basis unit of which  equals 100  cubic feet (2.831 cu.m). The term grt is progressively  being
replaced by 'gross tonnage (gt)', as defined  by the 1969  Convention  on Tonnage Measurement  of Ships
which came into force in 1982.
Hull  - A ship's body which is enclosed  by the main or weather deck of frames, beams, and plates,
below which may be one or more decks depending  on the type of the vessel and the purpose for which
it has been built.
Light Displacement  Tonnage (Idt)  - The actual weight  of an empty ship.  It is this particular tonnage
figure that is used by sale and purchase  brokers when negotiating  the disposal  of a vessel for demolition.
CBO Carriers - Vessels  of the combination  carrier group, which have common  cargo compartments  that
may be used for oil or for low-density  dry bulk commodities,  such as coal and ore.
Panamax - Referenced  to vessels with certain  dimensional  limitations  to be able to transit the Panama
Canal.
Protection  & Indemnity  Clubs - Mutual insurance  associations  representing  mainly  shipowners,  insuring
them against expenses and legal liabilities  in respect of ships and their crews.
Rating  - Seaman
Reefer Vessels - Ships  specifically  designed  for cargoes  which  deteriorate in ordinary  hold temperatures
and conditions,  such as meat, fish, vegetables,  fruit, and dairy products. They are fitted with numerous
insulated  tweendecks  and can, if necessary  also be used for the carriage of non-refrigerated  goods, like
cars, and bagged, baled, or palletized  cargo. But they are not equipped  to carry bulk cargoes.- 7  -
RoRo Vessels - Unit-load  vessels where thU  cargo is moved  on and off using trailers normally  carrying
containers.  A common characteristic  of these vessels is their intermodal  capability, which means that
their cargo can go directly into the highway  system.
Special Survey  - Every four years vessels must undergo a special survey of hull and another of
machinery,  although  both may be postponed  for up to a further twelve  months  if the classification  society
agrees, following  a general examination  which proves the vessel to be in a satisfactory  condition.  All
sea-going  vessels  have to be maint ined  in accordance  with the rules and regulations  of the class to which
they were assigned.
Suezmax  - Referenced to vessels with certain dimensional  limitations  to be able to transit the Suez
Canal.
Tankers (Oil and Product) - These vessels  are principally  involved  in the carriage  of crude oil and its
derivatives. The oil tanker category  essentially  comprises  three types: (1) the Ultra Large Crude Carriers
(ULCCs) which are used in long hauls; (2) the Very Large Crude Carriers which are used on the same
routes as the ULCCs  but with greater flexibilities  in discharging  port options, owing to their size; (3) the
medium size Crude Carriers of 70,000 to 130,000  tons deadweight  are mainly used on short hauls from
Mediterranean,  West African, Indonesian,  and North Sea loading  terminals  to major nearby consuming
areas. Product tankers with 26,000 to 40,000 tons deadweight  are used primarily  for the distribution  of
oil products from refinery to consumer.
Tankers (Chemical,)  - Class of vessel specifically  designed  to cater for the liquid chemicals  market,
capable of  transporting various grades of  chemicals, solvents, and  acids  in  a  variety of  cargo
compartments  ranging from mild steel-lined, through tanks provided with different coatings, such as
rubber-lined  tanks for phosphoric  acid.
Tankers (Gas)  - There are two categories: (1) Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) Tankers, and (2) Liquid
Petroleum Gas (LPG) Tankers.  The first category includes vessels designed to carry LNG, mostly
methane, which is held in a liquid state by pressure and refrigeration. The cargo spaces  consist of special
tanks whose upper sections  often protrude  above deck height in domed  or cylindrical  form.  The second
category are vessels  designed  to carry LPG, such as butane or propane. These are also carried in special
tanks under pressure and at very low temperatures. The tanks are often rectangular  in section  and may
be flanked  by wing tanks used to carry ballast water. The carrying capacity  of both tanker categories  is
specified in cubic meters; typical  tanker sizes range between  25,000 and 75,000 cubic meters.
Time Charter - Under such contract  a third party hires a ship for a fixed  period of time. The shipowner
is required to operate his ship but instead  of freight  payments  he receives previously  agreed sums of hire
money, in advance and at regular intervals.
Trip Charter - This type of chartering  signifies  a situation where a ship is hired for a single voyage  or
a roundtrip  under which the owner maintains  the responsibility  for operating  the vessel.  But the rate of
hire applicable to trip charters is generally  more related to current spot market freight rates and not to
the somewhat  lower freight levels that are normally associated  with time charters.
Twenty-foot  Equivalent Unit (TIEU)  - The basic unit for expressing  the capacity  to carry containers on
cellular, part-container,  or RoRo vessels. The purpose  of this unit is to have a common  denominator  forships designed to move containers  of 20, 35, or 40 feet in length, with a standard width and height of
eight feet.  Capacity is also expressed  in FEU ( = forty-foot  equivalent  units ).
Ultra Large Crude Carriers  - Large tankers of no official size but variously  described as being one
between 350,000 dwt and 550,000 dwt.
Very Large Crude Carriers - Large tankers of no official size but variously described as being one
between 100,000 dwt and 350,000 dwt.- 9-
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I.  INTRODUCTION
1.  In the course of the World  Bank's assistance  programs  for developing  countries fundamental  and
continuously  ongoing  changes  in the structure  of trade markets  and the organization  of the related  service
industries  have been identified. Particuilarly  the seatrade markets and the international  ocean transport
industry seemed to undergo substantial  change.  Freight origins and destinations  shiftec '-.iuch  more
rapidly than in the past, and the types of cargo  and their forms of packaging  kept changing. These  trends
became  more and more pronounced  since the beginning  of the 1980s. The Bank's first assessment  of the
causes and  effects  of  such  developments' concluded that  considerable changes in  international
manufacturing  and product marketing practices have tended to alter the profile of demand for ocean
transport in significant ways.  A  further conclusion was that technological  progress had enabled
shipowners and operators to drastically revamp their service offerings and networks in response to
changing ocean trans,-,ort  demand.  Az a result, the organization  of the international  ocean transport
industry has been--and  remains--in  a corstant state of flux.
2.  During the intervening  years, however,  there were many  manifestations  which seemed  to suggest
that this industry was increasingly  afflicted by deveiopments  that undermined its ability to serve the
seatrade markets efficiently. The international  merchant fleet has become critically overaged, and its
safety record is deteriorating.  There are frequtnt reports that freight earnings are below the cost of
operating ships, which is ascribed  to substantial  tonnage  overhangs  that have  developed  in many  segments
of  the irdustry.  Because of  inadequate revenue incomes, neglect of maintenance appears to  be
widespread. The decline in overall vessel productivity  and service reliability  is said to be largely due to
tonnage in poor condition. There are indications  that financial resources for fleet renewal and tonnage
overhaul are becoming  more limited. All in all, the status and appearance  of the industry in the early
1990s  could  be interpreted  as signals  that the ocean  transport  sector has drifted into a deeply rooted  crisis.
3.  This report documents  the findings  of a research  effort within the Bank's Transport, Water, and
Urban Development  Department  which was aimed at developing  a clearer  understanding  of the crisis in
the international  ocean transport industry. The intention  was to identify and analyze the root causes, to
assess the attributable  effects on the industry's performance,  and to establish a basis for projecting the
future course of international  ocean transport.
I Peters, Hans J. 1989. "Seatrade,  Logistics,  and Transport". Policy  and Research  Series 6.  World  Bank,  Washington,  D.C.- 10  -
II.  THE INTERNATIONAL  OCEAN TRANSPORT  INDUSTRY  AT PRESENT
4.  Towards the end of 1992 the world merchant fleet had a total carrying capacity of about 657
million  deadweigh:  tons (dwt), and almost 69 million  dwt were on order with shipyards in 40 different
countries  (see Table I below). During 1992  an estimated  total of 4.1 billion tons of seaborne cargo was
carried by the world's merchant  fleet which  produced  about 17.5 trillion  ton-miles  in the process. About
40 percent of the ocean  transport  activities  were in the oil trades, including  crude and petroleum  products;
another 40 percent was serving the key dry bulk trades, including  iron ore, coal, and grain, as well as
the minor bulks, such as agricultural  and forestry  products. Only one-fifth  of the registered  tonnage  was
e-a ged in the general cargo trades, which also comprises  the sea carriage  of containers.
Table 1: THE WORLD  MERCHANT  FLEET AND NEWBUILDINGS  ON ORDER
Status as of end 1992
Category  Order  Book  |  Existing  Fleet
l  dwt (mn)  # of units  dwt (mn)  # of units
General  Cargo Ships
(incl. Reefer tonnage)  2,922  475  92,982  16.094
Container Vessels
(all  kind)  4,918  175  29,994  1,281
Tankers
(Oil,  Chenical, Gas,  41,565  672  285,380  7,977
and Product categories)
Dry Bulk Ships
(incl. Combination  18,547  266  240,161  5,027
Carriers )
RoRo Vessels  0,720  87  8,146  1,024
WORLD TOTAL  68,672  1,675  65,663  31,403
Source: Fairplay. 'Newbuilding  Supplement". November  1992. London
Institute  of Shipping  Economics  and Logistics. 'Statstical  Tables'. Various issues. Bremen
5.  The consequence  of this market structure with its preponderance  of liquid and dry bulk cargoes
was that the majority of vessels deployed  during 1992 was operating  either on a charter or tramp basis,
which is common practice in the bulk trades.  In the general cargo trades the conference-based  liner
segment was much reduced in comparison  with previous years.  This phenomenon  confirms the earlier
recognizable  trend toward independent  action which has been increasingly  adopted by different carriers,
particularly in the container sector.  Under this type of arrangement  carriers negotiate  (freight) service
contracts directly with shippers.  By doing so, they by-pass  existing conference  rules for specific trade
routes.  Such service contracts often span longer periods, i.e. they are usually not limited to one
shipment,  and are widely  considered  to be more advantageous  to shipper and carrier alike than conference
regulated  ocean transport.- 11  -
6.  Continuing a  trend that could already be observed during the 1980s, 1992 saw a  further
concentration  of fleet ownership. Shipowners  in five countries  --Greece, Japan, the U.S.A., Norway,
and Hong Kong--controlled  over 50 percent of the world merchant  fleet.  But the present pattern of ship
registration  and 'flags flown' does not reflect the true state of ownership. Almost half of all merchant
ships which were registered in 1992 flew so-called 'Flags of Convenience'  (FOCs) of countries which
provide shipowners  with substantial  benefits. '. hese benefits  entail  tax allowances  or holidays, freedom
to crew ships with low-wage  labor, regardless  of nationality  and without  the involvement  of labor unions,
and frequently  also less stringent  vessel classification  and inspection  rules. Table 2 on page 12 provides
details.
7.  The principal countries that offered FOCs in  1992 were Liberia, Panama, Cyprus, and the
Bahamas,  a situation  which remained  largely unchanged  from earlier years.  Some European  countries--
notably  Germany  and Norway--have  established  'second national  flags' which provide for essentially  the
same benefits as FOCs, but they are primarily chosen by shipowners which are resident in these
countries.  On the other hand, there was some new development  during 1992 which led to a growing
importance  of formerly  less visible FOCs, like Malta. One factor  behind  these  occurrences  was the rapid
outflagging  of vessels  from the republics  of the former Soviet Union (FSU).
8.  Developing  countries,  as a group, could  double  their share of the world fleet during the ten years
preceding 1992, and now account for roughly 25 percent of ownership. However the majority of this
share-almost two-third--represents  ships owned by parties in Asia.  In addition, it is important  to note
that in those developing countries which have instituted liberal maritime regulations, shipowners in
growing  numbers resorted  to FOCs. China,  Indonesia,  and South  Korea  are examples. Industry  statistics
for the first three years of the 1990s  indicate  that this trend continues  unabatedly.
9.  While outflagging  is one phenomenon  that points to a fundamental  change  in the organization  of
international  ocean transport, another one relates to ship management.  Developments during 1992
demonstrate  that more shipowners  have passed the responsibility  for asset marketing  and operations to
professional  ship management  organizations. These  are usually  private companies  that are not involved
in ownership  but engage in managing  vessels on a contractual  basis to secure the best rates of return on
their clients'-the shipowners--investments.  A very substantial  portion  of the international  tanker and dry
bulk fleets were managed  under such arrangements,  basically  continuing  a trend which has set in during
the 1980s. But these arrangements  are not limited  to the bulk sector. As in preceding  years, also in 1992
there was a  growing number of general cargo and container vessel owners who resorted to  asset
management by professional organizations.  Most of these organizations  are located in the world's
principal shipping centers, like London, Hong Kong, New York, and Singapore. The users of these
vessel management  services  come from all country  groups, which  also include  developing  nations  and--as
the latest development--the  FSU republics.
10.  It  has  thus  become difficult to  identify the  true ownership of,  and  for  that matter the
accountability  for many vessels  engaged  in seatrading. The flag flown  and the port of registration  do not
any longer reveal conclusively. In addition to management  by third parties, there are usually mortgage
banks involved that have proprietary rights, and ships' officers  and ratings may be citizen of a variety
of countries.  It is therefore not unusual to identify several parties of different nationalities  that are
associated  with one ship. If anything,  ocean  transport  in the 1990s  has become a very complex  industry.- 12  -
Table 2:  THE WORLD  MERCHANT  FLEET
Ownership  and Registration  Patterns
Status: December  31, 1991
National  Foreign  Foreign  Total as
Country  of  Flag  Flag  Total  Flag as  percentage
Domicile  percentage  of World
dwt  dwt  dwt  of Total  Total
Greece  41 859998  52549313  94409311  55.7  14.8
Japan  32 951  196  49 836 719  82 787 915  60.2  13.0
U.S.A.  18 307 576  43 108 154  61 415 730  70.2  9.7
Norway  37 838 056  18 934 850  56 772 906  33.4  8.9
Hong Kong  3 887 664  28 258 783  32 146  447  87.9  5.1
FSU  27 233 783  2 579 203  29 812 986  8.7  4.7
China  19 8S5 948  6 058  735  25 914 683  23.4  4.1
United Kingdom  5 M70  529  17 570 273  23 440 802  75.0  3.7
South Korea  11 414 224  6 361 036  17 775 260  35.8  2.8
Germany  6 555 611  8 967 829  15 523 440  57.8  2.4
Denmark  7 763 652  4 927 169  12 690 821  38.8  2.0
Italy  9 900 320  1 663 541  11 563 861  14.4  1.8
Taiwan  7 368 914  4 1085 53  11 477 467  35.8  1.8
India  10 203 623  610 144  10 813 767  5.6  1.7
Brazil  9 356 082  443 112  9 799 194  4.5  1.5
Sweden  3 342 995  5 717 387  9 060 382  63.1  1.4
Iran  8 274 363  18 863  8 293 226  0.2  1.3
Turkey  7 017 974  561 281  7 579 255  7.4  1.2
Singapore  4 972 367  2 066 801  7 039 168  29.4  1.1
France  2 971 030  3 201 033  6 172  063  51.9  1.0
TOTAL  276,945,905  257,542,779  34,488,6  48.2  84.0
Source:  Lloyd's  Maritime  Infornation  Services.  London- 13  -
m1.  DEVELOPMENTS  IN THE INTERNATIONAL  SEATRADE  MARKETS
11.  In 1960 the annual volume of international  seatrade had reached a level of one billion tons, with
equal shares of dry and liquid cargo. During  the following  years the average annual gr^wth rate of liquid
cargo-essentially crude oil and its derivatives-was 11.5 percent.  The yearly increments  of dry cargo
were considerably  lower. In the early 1970s  the share of liquid cargo in the annual  seatrade volumes  had
increased to about 60 percent.  It peaked with 1.87 billion tons (versus 1.35 billion tons for dry cargo)
in 1973. During that year the first international  oil crisis materialized  and had an immediate  effect on
the volume of liquid cargo trades, which declined to 1.5 billion tons in 1975.  Meanwhile the annual
volumes  of dry cargo continued  to increase, caught  up with the liquid cargo trades in the mid 1970s,  and
exceeded  the growth of liquid cargo by considerable  margins until 1980 (see Figure i below).
F1gure 1  World Seatrade
By Main Trade Categories
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12.  At the beginning of the 1980s the second oil shock occurred.  Unlike in 1973, however, the
effects of this crisis impacted  on both trades, and their volumes  declined  for several years.  By 1983  the
total volume  of international  seatrade had fallen below the level of 1974. But the consolidation  phase for
dry cargo was relatively  short and growth  resumed  after 1983, whereas  the decline in annual liquid cargo
volumes continued until 1985. The mild recession in  the world economy of the mid 1980s had a
temporary dampening  effect on both trades.  Following  a brief respite each segment continued to grow- 14  -
after 1987, if at different  annual rates. The average yearly growth rate for each trade category and their
main sub-divisions  between 1985  and 1990 are shown in Table 3 on page 15.  By 1990 the total annual
seatrade volume reached four billion tons, including  about 2.5 billion tons of dry cargo and 1.5 billion
tons of liquid cargo.
13.  The dry cargo category of seatrade includes  dry bulk and general cargo.  Subsumed  under the
latter  are the containerized  and other forms of unitized  trades. The share of general cargo in total annual
seatrade volumes  has increased  from 12-14  percent in the early 1960s  to about 20 percent in 1990.
14.  All three phenomena--reduced  liquid  cargo, steeper  proportional  increases  in dry cargo volumes,
and a steady growth in the share of general cargo--point  to fundamental  changes  that have taken place
in the organization  and management  of international  seatrade.  Among  the three principal  categories  of
seatrade, the liquid cargo segment was the most vulnerable with regard to downturns in the world
economy.  Crisis situations  had an immediate  negative  impact on traded volumes which lingered much
longer than in the case of dry cargo. On the other hand, oice recovered  the ensuing annual  growth rates
of liquid cargo trades were higher than those displayed  by tire other trades.  Noteworthy  is the fact that
the general cargo trades were the least affected  by economic  crises and maintained  steady  growth trends
during most of the period between 1970  and 1990.
15.  During the years ahead the composition  and proportional  share of cargoes, as well as the growth
rates in the international  seatrade markets will be strongly influenced  by a number of factors.  These
factors  reflect predicted  further changes  in industrial  practice, in the structure and management  of global
trading, and in economic  and social policies  adopted  by individual  countries. Developments  along  these
lines during the 1980s  suggest  that the principal  drivers behind  the predicted  changes  are likely  to include
further globalization of manufacturing  processes, ongoing adjustments  to production techniques and
organization,  more relocation  of industries,  continued  integration  of key regional markets,  substantial
growth in value-adding  at source, an increasingly  forceful drive towards  conservation,  and the growing
importance  of environmental  concern.
16.  The globalization  of manufacturing  processes  has been  sparked  by the search among  Organization
for Economic  Cooperation  and Development  (OECD)  industries  for countries  which afford lower factor
costs and offer other conditions  of comparative  advantage.  These corporate objectives have already
induced substantial outsourcing of  intermediate manufacturing and assembly tasks to  a  variety of
developing countries  during the 1980s. A recent Bank survey 2 not only confirmed  these developments
but projected  much further expansion  of such industrial  practices. Owiv' to such trends the demand for
long-haul  ocean transport  of many  primary commodities  from developing  to industrialized  countries can
be expected  to diminish. On the other hand, however, there will be an increasing  need for small high-
value shipments  in short time intervals.
17.  The last observation reflects changes in production techniques and organization which have
evolved for a  number of reasons.  Firstly, growing integration of the acquisition, production, and
marketing processes through cost-minimizing  logistics management  techniques has induced the trend
towards inventory  reduction. These developments  have already led to very specific  demand for speedy
2 Peters, Hans  J.  1992. "Service  - The  New Focus  in  International  Manufacturing  and Trade". Policy  Research  Working  Paper
Series 950.  World  Bank, Washington,  D.C.- 15  -
Table 3:  THE RISE  AND FALL OF SEATRADE
Voluime Changes
l  .Category  (average annual percentages)
l~  ~  ~  ~  ~~~~~~~~"  18-  1990  IM9-  2000
l  ~~~~~~~~~~~ACTUALS  PROJECTIONS
KEY DRY BULK COMMODITIES  2.8  1.6
(of which)
Iron Ore  2.1  1.2
Steam Coal  4.3  6.5
Coking Coal  2.6  2.2
Grain  3.3  -1.7
Bauxite  5.0  0.7
Phosphate Rock  - 2.4  -2.0
Fertilizers  4.3  2.3
PETROLEUM  5.6  1.7
(of which)
Crude Oil  6.1  1.2
Products  3.1  3.5
MINOR  BULKS  1.5  1.6
(of which)
Agricultural  Products  2.0  1.3
Forestry Products  2.6  2.1
Ores  nd Minerals  1.9  1.6
Steel Products,  0.7  1.8
including  Scrap
ALL DRY BULKS  2.4  1.7
ALL LIQUID BULKS  5.7  1.7
ALL BULKS  COMBINED  4.0  1.7
GENERAL  CARGO  4.7  5.5
imt  E0Es  w  "  "
Source:  For Actuals: Drewry.  'Trade and Shipping  Statisics".  Various  issues. London
For Projections: Peters, Hans  J. 1991. 'The Prospeds of Seabome Bulk Trades
- A Reassessment". Mimeo. World  Bank,  Washington,  D.C.- 16 -
and highly reliable ocean transport services, which are fully integrated  with land transport systems to
enable streamlined  door-to-door  delivery arrangements. Secondly,  many industries  are seeking  out and
have started to use alternative,  more cost-effective  materials. For instance, modern  car manufacturing
incorporates 40 percent less steel than only ten years ago.  The value of goods shipped continues to
increase, but they need far less raw materials to be produced and less space for transportation. Thus
many of the customary cargoes in ocean transpon are losing importance  and are replaced by others,
requiring very different types of packaging  and transport.
18.  The relocation of industries phenomenon is demonstrated by the fact that in some OECD
economies industrial  enterprises  move entire production  complexes  to other countries  in order to by-pass
quota restrictions  and other regulatory  market constraints. Japanese  car manufacturing  in the U.S.A. and
Europe is an example.  The demand for sea transport of presumably a growing number of finished
industrial  products--particularly  automotive--will  thus diminish.
19.  The integration  of regional  markets  has become a universal  trend. There is increasing  evidence
of growing trade shares confined to  clusters of countries.  In particular, this will be the case for
geographic zones where inter-regional trade is promoted through special multilateral arrangements.
Eixamples  are the North American  Free fraoe Agreement  (NAFTA)  covering Canada, Mexico, and the
U.S.A.,  the Association  of Southeast  Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the European Community (EC).
Close to 65 percent of West Europe's trade is within the EC.  As a result of these developments,  each
region's volume of seaborne  trade with the outside  world can be expected  to decline.
20.  The value-adding  at source represents  growing efforts by many developing  countries to obtain
better income from indigenous products which were once shipped in their raw state but are now
increasingly  processed prior to shipment. For instance, several economies within the Organization  of
Petroleum  Exporting  Countries  (OPEC)  group have  started  to build  up their own petrochemical  industries
close to the source of crude oil.  The obvious implication  of these trends is reduced demand for bulk
transport of crude, and increased volumes of petroleum derivatives  which are carried in product and
chemical tankers.  Similar observations  apply to other raw materials in the mining and agricultural
sectors, and the related effects on long-term  demand for ocean transport.
21.  Conservation  has been identified  as another  factor which will influence  future demand for ocean
transport.  Previous energy crises have induced major reductions  in oil demand.  As a case in point,
Japan could reduce its oil consumption  by 50 percent during the years following  the oil crisis of the mid-
seventies. There is also growing interest in recycling  which tends to suppress the demand for original
raw materials.  In several OECD countries up to one-third of national  steel production  is derived from
recycled  scrap. Similar conservation  measures  can be observed  with other primary inputs  to production.
The effect of such practices has already been such that the demand  for ocean transport for a number of
raw materials has declined  within several trade regions.
22.  Finally  there is the roint of environmental  concern. The main impact  of such concem is related
to thfe  energy sector where the demand for alternative 'clean fuel' is growing, particularly in Western
Europe and Japan.  Coal and oil as energy source are widely seen as major sources of avoidable
pollution. The outcome  of new energy  policies adopted  in a number  of industrialized  countries translates
into more transport  of Liquified  Natural  Gas (LNG)  and reduced demand  for transport of oil and coal in
some segments  of the seatrade market.  Another  example  of enviconmental  concern  and its influence  on
ocean transport are government  policies restricting  the expansion  of national oil refining capacities-as- 17  -
is the case in Japan.  There will be reduced flow of crude into these countries, which will be offset by
increasing import  of pre-processed  petroleum  derivatives  from overseas. Both phenomena  will influence
the future composition  and scale of seatrade.
23.  The medium-term outlook for the growth of seatrade is modest.  Average annual growth
projections until  1995 are given in Table 3 on page 15.  Trade volumes per year for  almost all
commodities  are expected  to be lower than the annual averages  of the late 1980s. A notable exception
are the general cargo trades which are likely to continue their path of solid growth.  The industrial
restructuring and the new approaches  to manufacturing  and marketing  will contribute to even steeper
annual increases of the general cargo trades.  These projections are based on the assumption  that the
current recession in Japan, North America, and Western Europe will bottom out in the mid 1990s,  and
that from 1996 onwards  annual economnic  growth rates will attain levels which were common  during the
second half of thL.  1980s.
24.  Such scenario can be expected  to create a situation whereby the yearly volume of seatrade will
be of the order of five billion tons at the end of the 1990s. The share of dry cargo will increase further
to about 65 percent of total seaborne  trade.  In the liquid cargo segment  petrolet in  products will have
reached a more prominent stance vis-a-vis  crude oil.  The annual incidence  of general cargo is forecast
to reach 1.3 billion tons, which would mean a further expansion  of this segment  of the seatrade markets
from 20 percent in 1990  to a share between  26 and 28 percent of all cargo  transactions  in the international
ocean transport industry.
IV.  HOW THE OCEAN TRANSPORT  INDUSTRY  COPES WITH VOLATILE  SEATRADE
Fxperience  suggests  that it takes  about six months  until recessionary  trends  in
the world economy  start to have an impact on the seatrade markets,  and that
it takes another 12 to 15 months  for the ocean transport  industry  to react.
25.  During the first years after the end of World War n the international  seatrade market grew at
unprecedented  rates.  These developments  lasted for almost thirty years and provided  shipowners with
attractive earning opportunities.  The returns on  investments in  shipping assets were  substantial.
Consequently  the international  merchant fleet grew very fast, more than doubling  its collective  carrying
capacity between 1950  and 1970. In view of the continuous  rapid  expansion  of seatrade  and their derived
steady stream of freight revenues-which usually far exceeded the cost of providing ocean transport-
shipowners  became  so complacent  that many  did not recognize  the potential  effects  of the oil crisis in the
mid-seventies  on the performance  of the world economy,  and hence  on trading  activities. In fact, the few
cautioning  voices  were silenced  when seatrade  picked  up again  around 1975,  and more ships were ordered
in anticipation  of continued  steep  growth trends in the seatrade  markets. And  so the world merchant  fleet- 18 -
increased  to 650 million  dwt in 1980. In the process  the collective  carrying capacity  of the fleet doubled
again, but this time in less than ten years.  However  there is no market in which expectations  of future
profitability do not sooner or later stimulate  the introduction  of excess capacity.
26.  When the resumed  growth of annual seatrade volumes  came to a sudden end in the late 1970s,
the previous  expansion  pattern of the world  merchant  fleet changed  considerably. The collective  carrying
capacity of the fleet remained within a  limited band between 620 and 650 million dwt during the
following ten years.  In view of the fact that the annual growth rates of seatrade turned negative and
continued that way for several years, many ocean transport operators adopted for the first time a more
cautious  approach  to fleet development  and managing  their assets. But there were differences  of opinion
and in approach among  shipowners  serving the different trade segments  (see Figure 2 below).
Development  of the World Merchant Fleet
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27.  After the global recession  of the 1980s  bottomed  out in 1986 international  trade intensified  again,
and when the annual seatrade volumes started to grow at rates which had been characteristic for the
heydays  during the years before the first oil crisis, shipowners  took this as indications  of a future bullish
seatrade  market. A common  belief was that this trend would continue  unabatedly. The number  of orders
placed for newbuildings  rose again. The accumulated  tonnage  on order in 1990  exceeded  60 million  dwt
and thus reached the highest level since 1977.- 19  -
28.  When the annual volumes of seatrade declined and there was hardly any  reduction in  the
combined  carrying capacity  of the world merchant  fleet,  severe  tonnage overhangs developed. In 1983,
almost one-third  of the fleet was unemployed. Tonnage  utilization  in the bulk shipping sector was much
more affected  by the cyclical swings in the international  seatrade markets than the liner trades with
general cargo.  The tanker sector
suffered the most pronounced  effects
(42 percent of the fleet unemployed
in 1983), followed by the dry bulk
Owners'  Attitudes  fleet (26 percent), and the general
in Times  of  Uncertainty  cargo fleet (ten percent). Thanks to
the revival of the seatrade markets
during the second half of the 1980s,
Dry Bulk  Vessels  the supply overhang  came down a id
has,  since 1989, stabilized around
16  l  ten percent of the world merchant
14  . fleet's  capacity, as a  whole.  But
12  '  there are differences.  In the tanker
10  \  :sector,  excess tonnage represented
lO  /  \  ,  z  ~~~~~~~~~~16  percent of the fleet during the
8-I  k  . final weeks of  1992.  It  was  12
6-  /  . -\<  :percent  in the case of the dry bulk
4 - --  \  't.  fleet, but only 4.7 percent for the
2 - ,  ,  ,  a-  general  cargo  segment.  The
0  container  fleet  continued  to  be
80  81  82  83  84  S5  86  87  88  89  90  91  almost  fully employed.
- LAY  - UP  ----  DEMOLITION
29.  Most shipowners appeared
Source:  Lloyd's  Shipping  Economist  end Feernieys  unable to accept the fact that during
the 1980s trends had started which
Tankers  were leading  to fundamental  changes
million dwt  in the structure of the international
80  seatrade  markets  and  in  annual
70-  volume growth rates of the different
60-  cargo categories.  Thus they were
50-  hesitant to  eliminate underutilized
40  \  assets in the hope that a  renewed
30  market  uptum  would  generate increasing  demand  for  ocean
20-  /'  transport,  and  hence  provide for
10-  improved capacity  utilization for
o8  82  8  8  8  their fleets.  As a result, a majority
80  81  82  83  84  85  86  87  88  89  90  91  of  owners  opted  for  temporary
- LAY  - UP  ----  DEMOLITION  withdrawal of their ships from the
market by  laying them up.  This
Figure  3  behavior was most pronounced in
the  tanker sector (see  Figure  3).
Statistics relating  to changes  in fleet- 20  -
composition and growth rates--as in Figure 2--disguise  the fact that only active tonnage is registered.
Adding laid-up vessels would result in different indicators.
30.  As the decline  of seatrade volumes  continued  in the mid 1980s,  a number  of owners camne  around
to realize that eliminating  some of their shipping assets through demolition would be commercially
prudent. Thus the tonnage sola for scrapping  increased  to over 30 million dwt between 1985  and 1986.
But as soon as the market seemed  to give positive indications  through impressive  advances in the Baltic
Freight Index--which  reflects developments  in the freight futures market--during 1987, the number of
demolition  sales shrank.  At the same time the number of newbuilding  contracts increased sharply (see
Figure 4 on below).  These attitudes and practices point to the fact that the ocean transport industry
distinguishes  itself from other industries  through  very speculative  behavior. But  the high level of periodic
investments in shipping, the value of existing assets, and its debt servicing obligations make ocean
transport one of the most capital-intensive  of all industries. Substantial  freight revenues are needed to
keep the ocean transport industry viable and thus in a position  to provide the type of services  which are
required by the changing  level and structure of international  demand for the sea carriage of goods.
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31.  However freight rates have been highly  volatile since the early 1980s. When seatrade declined
and essentially  the same number of ships remained available  for lower overall volumes of cargo, both
phenomena  combined  to spark intense  competition  which  provoked freight rates to contract  substantially.- 21  -
And  while  these  effects  could  be deemed  favorable
for trade,  they  sent  many  carriers  into a tailspin. In
Vol ati le  Freig h t  Ear n i  ng s  growing  numbers  shipowners  were  forced  to reduce Volatile  Freight Earningsfreight  rates  to defend their share in the cargo
market.  But in the wake of such pricing practices PANAMAX  BULKER  NEWBUILDING  actual rate levels barely covered operating cost.
Spot Return,  Time-Charter  Basis  With  the renewed  slowdown  in the seatrade  markets
US$,  thousands/day  during the early 1990s,  the freight earnings in most
1-  segments of  the  international ocean  transport e8000  OWT  costing  USs  32.5  million  industry were considerably below the break-even
10 percent return assvmed
Amortiation  oera  years  levels which reflect the minimum charter rates or 13-  freight  tariffs  to  cover  all  cost  of  financing,
BREAK  EVEN  managing,  and  operating  a cargo  vessel--and  which
1  \  US$  11,350/day  would yield a  modest return on  investment (see
Figure 5).  Between 1989 and  1992 the average
internal rates of return on investments in shipping
9  assets shrank from 9.5 percent to almost zero.  In
real terms the freight rates in most segments of the
seatrade markets have been on a declining trend
7 - during most of the time since the beginning of the
1980s  (see Table 4 on page 22).
Source:  Sealrade  Week
5,
A  S  0  N  D  J  F  M  A  M  J  J  32.  The  outlook  for  improved  commercial
1991  1992  performance  of shipping assets is not encouraging.
SECONDHAND  SUEZMAX  TANKER  In some specialized  market segments, such as the Spot  Return,  Time-Charter  Basis  container  trades,  unchecked  ordering  of
newbuildings  has led to such severe overtonnaging
5 US$  thousands/day  that  the  medium-term prospects for  high  load
152,000  DWT.  built  1977  factors  are modest (see  Table  5 on page  23).  The
23  bought  in  July  1991  at  US$1826  million 1O  percent  return  assumed  idicators  m this table pomt to another important
21  Ahortization  to  Scrap over  three yeara  fact.  International statistics on  the  degree  of
19  tonnage  utilization  do not reflect load factors, which is particularly critical in the case of  liner trades.
17 - Thus, the high utilization  rates reported (above) for
is.5BREAK  EVEN  *  the general cargo and container  fleets should be
US$  14,500/day  interpreted with  caution.  The  actual  tonnage 13\  utilization-appropriately  adjusted for load factors--
119  is therefore  usually lower than the statistics  suggest.
33.  Since  the trend in container shipping  on the
7Source:  Seersde  Wek  main trade routes has been such that the ten key
5  SON  0,  ,  F  A  M  carriers now effectively  control more than 70 A  S  0  9  D  J  F  M  A  M  J  J  percent  of the market-with further concentration  of
their  market  shares  predicted-it  has  become
Figure  5  possible for these carriers to  'rationalize' freight
I__  rates and  the  level of  tonnage deployed.  For
exampie,  in the trans-Atlantic  and trans-Pacific- 22  -
trades the dominating  carriers have combined  to establish  so-called rate agreements  through which they
collectively  pledged to reduce their active  tonnage  on such trade routes and to abide by commonly  agreed
freight tariffs.  These rate agreements  have all the makings of a cartel.  Owing to these arrangements,
the container freight rates in the cross-Atlantic  and Pacific trades are the only instances in the entire
seatrade market where nominal  increases  have occurred  since 1990.
Table 4:  OCEAN  TRANSPORT  RATE INDICATORS
Gyrations  in Response  to Changing  Market  Conditions
I  1  1984  1986  1988  1990  1  1992
Container  Trades  Trade  Routes:
(Major Conference  Rates  Europe-Far  East  2,31P  2,309  3,263  3,266  2,778
in US$/TEU)  Atlantic westbound  - 2,485  2,841  3,121  3,248
Pacific westbound  - - 650  1,157  1,498  1,629
Europe-Australia  4,884  5,325  6,942  7,884  6,386
General Cargo Trades
(Tramp Trip Charter  Vessel  Capacity:
in US$/dwt/month)  12000-20000  dwt  7.4  6.0  12.2  11.9  10.0
20000-35000  dwt  4.9  3.7  8.4  7.9  7.4
Dry Bulk Trades  Vessel  Canacitv:
(Single  Voyage  Rates  2500  dwt  18.1  19.2  35.1  32.8  30.9
in US$/ton of cargo)  120000  dwt  6.0  3.7  6.8  6.9  4.6
Tanker Trades  Vessel  C'wacitv:
(Period Market  30000  dwt  6.6  6.8  7.9  11.6  9.6
in US$/dwt/month)  250000 dwt  0.8  1.4  1.6  2.7  1.8
General Freight Index
annual  averages; 1972 =  100 [  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
369  321  232  220  217  208  172  203  261  284  261  250  228
Source: Lloyd's "Shipping  Economist'. Various  issues. London; and Maritime  Research  Services. Parlin, New  Jersey
34.  But the vast majority  of carriers in the international  ocean transport  industry is reeling under the
effects of reduced freight earnings. What makes their lot not easier is the fact that the prices paid for
second-hand vessels or  tonnage sold for demolition have gyrated in ways which turned out to be
unfavorable  for them. When freight  markets were solid and shipowners  showed  little predilection  to sell
tonnage in order to improve  their cashflow situation,  second-hand  and demolition  prices were relatively
high, but in times of market decline  both prices  dropped (see Table 6 on page 24).  Due to the long lead
times in shipbuilding,  which may extend  over three years between  ordering  and delivery, the movements
in vessel unit prices were less volatile. The actual cost of new ships have steadily increased  since 1986
in the wake of speculative  ordering which has characterized  the market during most of the intervening
years.  The new and costly ships are being successively  delivered  until about 1994  and will burden their- 23  -
owners with high cost at a time when they are facing only modest  prospects for growth in seatrade--and
thus improved freight earnings.
Table  5:  INTERNATIONAL  CONTAINER  TRAFFIC
Vessel  Capacity  Utilization
observed  and  expected  load  factors  in percent
Year  Transatlantic  Transpacific  Europe  - Far East
eastbound Twestbound  eastbound  westbound  eastbound  westbound
1991  62.2  54.4  71.7  60.7  53.1  85.7
1992  62.8  56.4  76.1  63.8  51.3  84.2
1993  62.6  56.3  77.9  64.9  50.2  82.1
1994  62.7  56.4  78.5  65.1  50.0  81.4
1995  64.7  58.5  79.1  65.5  49.0  77.6
1996  66.8  60.8  79.3  65.5  51.1  78.7
Source: For observed indicators:  "Containerization  International". Various  issues. London
For expected  load factors:  'International  Transport  Journal". Issue 49, 1992. Basle
35.  Because  of continued  poor revenue earnings, shipowners  had to cut cost wherever  possible.  In
growing numbers they opted for outflagging  their tonnage to FOC countries which reduced their tax
burden and enabled them to hire low-wage  personnel. Unfortunately,  however, cost cutting also meant
in many cases neglect or deference of maintenance  which caused accelerated  physical deterioration of
shipping  assets and has to be seen as a main cause for increasing  ship casualties. Conmmercial  pressures
on masters to improve the revenue earning perfonnance of their ships have induced reckless loading
practices  in ports and the operation  of ships  at speeds  beyond  design limits with deleterious  effects  on hull
structures.  Low-wage  personnel  often implied  unqualified  seafarers. Human error has been identified
as a principal reason for accidents  at sea and in ports.
36.  Another defensive strategy which has been increasingly  adopted by many owners is to keep
existing  shipping assets beyond  commonly  accepted  economic  life spans, which are typically  between 15
and 20 years.  Considering  current prices of newbuildings  and the freight rates the market is willing to
pay, a decision to continue with aged tonnage was more than ever deemed superior--from  a corporate
management  point of view--to  a combination  of scrapping  and acquisition  of new tonnage. But for much
of this kind of aged tonnage major repairs would be required before such vessels could continue to
operate safely and profitably.
37.  Ship upgrading  or conversion  have  become  other  attractive  propositions  through  which  older ships
are either technologically  improved, e.g.  refitted with more powerful and fuel efficient engines, or
physically transformed  to serve other trades than the ones for which they were originally  designed  and
built.  The upgrading of vessels leads to better operational  performance--by  permitting faster steaming
and shorter cargo handling  times--and  thus to enhanced  revenue  earnings. Shifting  of converted  tonnage
to other trades, for which the growth  prospects  are more promising,  has already enabled many operators- 24  -
to contain further deterioration  of their cashflows. On the whole, however, conversion  usually entails
heavy outlays, and proper market analyses  would be necessary  before committing  funds.  During 1990
the average cost of vessel conversion  was US$ 10.6 million.
Table 6:  TONNAGE PRICE FLUCTUATIONS
[  Tonnage  Category  T 1985  j  1986  |  1988  1 1990  1991  |  1992
NEWBUILDINGS - Prices in current US$ (million)
!  Tankers
(80,000  dwt)  22.0  18.8  31.5  41.4  43.0  42.0
Dry Bulk Carriers
(30,000 dwt)  11.3  11.7  18.5  23.8  24.1  24.5
General  Cargo  Ships
(15,000  dwt)  12.8  14.2  17.3  24.0  24.1  24.2
Container  Vessels
(2,500 TEU)  26.0  27.9  32.0  51.0  55.8  59.9
SECOND-HAND  TONNAGE  - Prices  in current US$ (million)
Tankers
(80,000  dwt,  6.5  10.8  17.4  28.7  24.8  16.3
8-10 years old)
Dry Bulk  Carriers
(30,000 dwt,  4.7  3.6  10.8  12.7  12.7  14.0
5-6 years old)
General  Cargo Ships
(15,000 dwt,  3.2  3.3  5.2  10.2  10.2  11.2
5-6 years old)
Container Vessels
(1,600  TEU,  14.1  14.0  14.2  22.2  21.3  22.6
5-6 years old)
DEMIOLITION  - Tonnage  Acquisition  Cost in current US$ (million)
Tankers
(80,000  dwt)  1.8  1.9  3.8  4.0  3.0  2.5
Dry Bulk Carriers
(30,000  dwt)  0.7  0.7  1.3  1.5  1.0  1.0
General Cargo Ships
(15,000 dwt)  0.9  0.8  1.7  1.8  1.3  1.3
Container Vessels  No demolition sales reported
Source: Lloyd's Shipping  Economist. Various  Issues. London- 25  -
38.  By looking ahead  to the end of the current decade, and considering  the expected  future trends in
the international seatrade markets, several inferences can be drawn with respect to  managing the
development  and the organization  of the different fleet segment,. Clearly, the tanker sector remains  th^
most vulnerable.  Growth prospects for the liquid cargo trades are modest, yet the fleet remains
oversize;l, and newbuilding  contracts for tankers represent the highest share in the current order books
of the international  shipbuilding industry.  The outlook is more promi.sing  for the dry bulk trades.
However the fleet is critically  overaged, many  vessels are technologically  outmoded, and in a poor state
of repair.  Arguably the brightest growth prospects relate to the general cargo, and in particular to the
container trades.  High employment indicators for the container fleet seem to suggest the need for a
substantial newbuilding  program.  But, as demonstrated,  these indicators are potentially misleading  in
view of the actual  and projected  load factors. Thus container  vessel owners and operators  need to adopt
a cautious  approach  when it comes  to considering  fleet expailsion  through  the acquisition  of new tonnage.
The situation is different with the multi-purpose  general cargo fleet.  There is likely to be continued--if
not growing--demand  for vessels  with built-in  flexibility  to serve different  trades and types of cargo. The
expected  integration  of regional markets will imply a steady increase  of shortsea trading for which this
type of vessel will be in demand.
39.  The future status and performance  of the world  merchant  fleet will be largely determined  by the
shipowner  and operator communities' response  behavior. The international  ocean transport industry  is
very heterogenous,  and distinguishes  itself in this respect from all other transport industries.  Diverse
interests and  business objectives, complicated multiple and  often  cross-national ownership and
organizational  arrangements,  and ill-devised  policies which are maintained  by several governments  to
promote national fleets at any cost can be expected to  impede attempts which would be  aimed at
rationalizing  tonnage  utilization  and  fleet management.
V.  THE PRINCIPAL  ISSUES  IN INTERNATIONAL  OCEAN TRANSPORT
40.  Continuing  substantial  tonnage  overhangs  in the world's merchant  fleet seem to suggest a priori
that market forces  could  be expected  to induce  a 'correcting  mechanism'  through which  a balance  between
demand (for ocean transport)  and supply (of diverse categories  of tonnage)  would ultimately  be brought
about. Inefficient  operators  would  be crowded  out of the market, sub-standard  ships  would be eliminated,
and freight rates would consolidate  at levels which would turn out to be beneficial  for cargo owners and
carriers alike.  Unfortunately,  the global realities are quite different.  New ships enter the market with
questionable  justification, inefficient  operators  continuc  to operate with government  protection, and the
share of poorly maintained and unsafe ships in the international  ocean transport industry is growing
incessantly.  All  these circumstances can  be  regarded as  harbingers of  an  emerging crisis  of
unprecedented  proportions.
A.  Regulators  Interventions
41.  The international  ocean transport industry has, in a  way, become anonymous.  Successful
shipowners finance, register, crew, market, and manage their assets without regard of loyalty to any
specific nation or interest group.  They have become true internationalists. Their only concern is to- 26  -
ensure that they capture major market  shares and achieve  the highest  possible return  on their investments.
In pursuit of these objectives  they compete  vigorously  and gain market superiority  through differentials
in freight rates and service offerings, and by establishing  a track record of reliability and consistent
quality of service. If left alone, their competitive  behavior  would create a situation whereby  shippers in
all markets of the world would  benefit by being able to choose and obtain  the most advantageous  service
arrangements  for their ocean transport needs.  The fact that this is still widely not feasible can be
considered  as possibly the most serious issue in ocean transport.
42.  Many governments  maintain policies which are aimed at protecting  their national fleets.  This
situation applies to industrialized  and developing countries  alike.  Cargo reservation for national flag
carriers is the most pervasive regulatory instrument. Thus national flag carriers are shielded against
competitive  pressures in the international  ocean transport market.  As a result, their performance is
usually  far below comparable  indicators  which  are characteristic  of the international  carriers--and  the cost
of their services are higher.  In the process, domestic importers  and exporters receive lower quality of
service and are faced with higher than necessary  freight rates. All of this would  not be necessary  in view
of the large international  fleet that competes and operates without regulatory constraints.  But the ill-
guided concern about avoidable losses in invisible trade keeps a large number of governments from
accepting  the fact that buying shipping  services in the international  market would be a most beneficial
decision, and in the best interest of national  trade.
43.  in most instances  national  flag carriers have  to be heavily  subsidized  so that their freight charges
can be made compatible  with rates which are offered  by carriers operating in free market environments.
In several developing  countries governments  are also encouraging  national flag carriers to compete in
cross-trades  which have neither an origin nor a destination  in the home country. The declared  objective
is foreign exchange  earning.  But to ensure a share for their carriers in these markets, governments  are
usually again compelled  to provide substantial  subsidies.  In the majority of developing countries the
policy to preserve transport rights for national flag carriers--in order the improve the invisible trade
account--is  ill-guided  in the sense that the maintenance  and operation of a national  fleet are very foreign
exchange-intensive.  Without  domestic  oil resources, steel making,  and an efficient  shipbuilding  industry,
the only savings that materialize  are the cost of crewing and vessel management--assuming  that these
functions would be fulfilled by nationals.  A stringent cost-benefit  analysis of such maritime sector
policies and the implied  subsidies would produce appalling  results in most, if not all countries whose
governments  maintain such regulatory attitudes. In addition, their subsidized  fleets inflate the already
over-stocked  international  shipping market and contribute  to further distortions in the market's supply-
demand relations.
44.  These developments  have been encouraged  to a considerable  extent by the Code of Conduct  for
Liner Conferences  which was conceptualized  in the 1960s  under the auspices  of the United  Nations Trade
and Development  (UNCTAD) organization.  The Code became effective in the mid 1970s after 50
countries had acceded, as was required by its statutes. In essence, the Code provides for a 40-40 split
in the right for ocean transport of cargo by the respective  national flag carriers between two trading
countries.  The remaining  20 percent of the trade was to be left to carriers who are involved in ctoss
trading, regardless of their nationality. These provision were to be embedded in bilateral agreements,
which took the form of a conference.  A number of industrial nations--such  as the U.S.A.--decided
against  joining this regulated  conference  system, as it was rightfully  feared that such arrangements  would
induce inefficiencies,  and would ultimately  be harmful to theix .rades.- 27  -
45.  When the Code was conceptualized  in the 1960s, the situation in the international seatrade
markets, and the organization  ard service provisions  of the world merchant  fleet where such that there
was a legitimate concern to ensure that all countries--regardless  of their location and status--and  their
trades received a fair allocation of tonnage for ocean transport.  In the meantime, however, the size,
organization,  and service  offerings  in the international  ocean  transport  industry  have changed  completely.
Competitive  services  and ample tonnage  supply  are available  in all corners of the world. Regulating  the
supply and operation of cargo vessels has therefore become redundant. Those countries  who adhere to
the Code now usually pay a heavy and intrinsically  avoidable price.  In many trading areas ocean
transport services are competitively  provided by international  carriers who operate outside conference
rules and organizations.  The benefits for countries who have opened their seatrade to international
competition are usually substantial. Chile is a prime example 3. However, the fact that a number of
developing  countries--particularly  in Sub-Saharan  Africa--find  it difficult  to disengage  from the Code and
its rules gives cause for concern.  They are thus undermining  the competitiveness  of their own trades,
and their inefficient  fleets contribute  to the inflation  of the over-sized  world merchant  fleet.
46.  Another factor which has tended to affect the market balance is subsidized  shipbuilding. Most
nations with a tradition in shipbuilding  want to keep their yards employed. But significant  differentials
in factor costs and productivity  parameters among yards in different countries have created situations
whereby several of the traditional  shipbuilding  nations  have become uncompetitive. Their yards should
thus be closed. The fact is that they are not.  Instead,  the governments  of countries  with 'disadvantaged'
yards have resorted to subsidizing their shipbuilding industries.  The forms of such subsidies are
manifold,  many  of them are concealed,  and their incidence  is usually  heavy. There are many  cases where
state subsidies  have enabled shipyards  to offer newbuildings  at prices which are below the actual cost of
vessel construction. In other situations  potential  purchasers were enticed to buy new tonnage through
financing  arrangements  that were made  attractive  by interest rates which  were substantially  below current
cost of capital in the international  markets. Extended  grace periods and amortization  schedules  increased
the attractiveness of such financing packages even further.  The cost of all these direct or indirect
subsidies  burden national  budgets extraordinarily,  and the usually  high opportunity  cost of public capital
call in question  whether a continuation  of such shipbuilding  support policies is justifiable.
47.  Subsidized  shipbuilding  and the abundance  of offers to sell newbuildings  below construction  cost
have been additional  factors that influence  the supply-demand  relations in international  ocean transport.
Shipping service providers whose corporate practices are usually characterized  by speculative  attitudes
acquired below-cost newbuildings  even at times of sluggish seatrade markets.  They captured such
opportunities to be prepared when seatrade would grow again.  But their expectations were rarely
fulfilled,  and the speculatively  acquired  tonnage  caused  further supply-side  inflation  in the ocean transport
market.
B.  The Aging International  Fleet
48.  In the years before 1980, the average age of tankers was 15 years at the time when they were
withdrawn  from the market to be scrapped;  for dry bulk carriers it was 18 years. Both indicators  seemed
3 For a full description  of Chile's experience  with deregulation  of the maritime  industries  see: Bennathan,  Esra et al.  1989.
'Deregulation  of Shipping  - What  is to be learnedfrom Chile?" Discussion  Paper  Series 67.  World  Bank,  Washington,  D.C.- 28  -
to confirm the generally perceived life span of  15 to 20 years during which a shipping asset could
perform  economically. When  developments  in the seatrade  markets  after 1980  suggested  that fundamental
changes  in the structure of demand for ocean  transport  and volume  growth rates were taking place, many
shipowners  became  more cautious. They  started to order fewer newbuildings  and relied on their existing
shipping assets.  As the market contracted  further, they resorted  to tonnage  lay-up, rather than sending
their ships for scrapping.  Even when the seatrade markets revived in 1986 they kept most of their
existing  tonnage, addressing growing  demand  more through re-commissioning  previously  laid-up vessels
than through the acquisition  of newbuildings.
49.  As a result of these practices,  the average  age of the world merchant  fleet increased  continuously.
The proportion of vessels older than 15 years grew from 27.5 percent in the mid-1980s  to 56.8 percent
in 1992. The average vessel age in 1992  was 16.6 years and is expected  to increase  by five percent per
annum, if no corrective  measures  are taken. The tanker segment  is most overaged  with almost 65 percent
of all vessels older than 15 years, followed  by general cargo ships with about 60 percent.  The dry bulk
fleet is on average younger--with  only 42 percent of the fleet older than 15 years-,  but in some of its
specialized  categories,  such as OBO carriers, more  than 70 percent  of all units have been trading  for more
than 15 years.  Only the fleet of dedicated  container  vessels is young, with 72.5 percent less than 15
years of age.  See Figure 6 below for details.
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50.  As any physical asset, ships deteriorate over time.  The rate of deterioration  accelerates in the
absence  of proper maintenance. When  their freight earnings  shrank many  shipowners  severely curtailed
maintenance  expenditures,  and the maintenance  intervals  were extended. A random  survey  of 100  trading
ships by the British Joint Hull Committee in 1991 found that only 18 were in full compliance with the
rules that govern seaworthiness  classification. Of the vessels  with deficiencies  40 percent were so badly
damaged that immediate  repairs were required before they would be allowed  to accept cargo again.
51.  Resulting from the continuous  deterioration of the world merchant fleet, there has been a
growing incidence of ship casualties. But unlike the dramatic media reports may suggest, the highest
casualty rate occurred in the dry bulk sector (43 percent of all casualties  in 1991), followed  by tankers
(29 percent) and all other vessel categories  (28 percent). Between 1988  and 1991 the loss ratio--dwt of
lost ships as a percentage  of total world tonnage--doubled  from 0.2 to 0.4.  During the last five years 94
dry bulk carriers were lost with 381 lives and 2.6 million  tons of cargo. More than 80 percent of these
casualties were due to structural failure, and over 90 percent of the vessels concerned were older than
15 years.  The Institute of London Underwriters reported that 1991 was the worst year in total loss
records.  The estimated cost of cargo losses in the dry bulk sector reached almost US$ 800 million,
whereas the replacement  cost of lost ships exceeds  US$ five billion.
52.  Tht  fleets with flags of four countries--Panama,  Cyprus, Greece, and Liberia--accounted  for
almost 50 percent of all casualties. More than three-quarter  of all ships lost in 1991 (1.3 million grt)
were registered in developing  countries. The West European  economies  continue  to have  the lowest ship
loss record.  Exemplary  is also the low casualty  rate among  FSU carriers, which can largely be ascribed
to very effective  vessel condition  control by the Soviet Register  of Shipping.
53.  Given the steadily increasing age profile of the world merchant fleet and modest prospects of
improved  freight earnings--which  are likely to induce  many  shipowners  to keep  maintenance  expenditures
limited--it  is foreseeable  that the casualty  rate will increase. This expectation  is also reflected  in the risk
calculations  by the Protection  & Indemnity  Clubs which cover the insurance  of 90 percent of the world
fleet.  Vessel insurance  premiums  have doubled  during the last 18 months. As a consequence,  insurance
is now with 30 percent share the largest single item in ship operating  cost, which has greatly increased
owners' annual expenditures. If the condition  of the fleet does not improve significantly,  insurance  cost
can be expected  to increase further  which would make many  vessels  uneconomical  to operate. Such cost
increase may even bankrupt  several financially  distraught  shipowners.
54.  The insurers have started  to take a close look at vessel manning  and operating  practices. Poorly
trained crews have been identified  as one of the key causes of the escalating  number of claims.  In
addition to hiring low-wage  personnel,  many vessel operators have also reduced crew sizes in order to
cut cost.  In support of this objective several shipyards have developed vessel designs which allow
operators to decrease personnel  on board, essentially  by automating  many  functions  which  are associated
with ship operations. The average crew size was 30 during the early 1970s  and is now around 14.  But
insurance  companies  have realized  that reduced  crew sizes are among  the main reasons for accidents  and
also of inadequate  preventive  maintenance,  much of which is carried out while a vessel is on voyage.
It is therefore to be expected  that the insurers will shortly introduce a requirement  for minimum levels
of crewing which will be higher than the current number  of personnel  on board of most vessels.  They
will also insist on higher  personnel  qualification  standards  and more rigorous  periodic  testing of seafarers'
skills.- 30  -
55.  About 1.2 million  seafarers  are presently  employed  in the international  ocean transport industry.
A previously  unimaginable  situation  has developed  whereby  the global supply  of seafaring  personnel  has
contracted sharply.  The number of new annual job entrants in the traditional maritime nations has
declined.  A study commissioned  by the International  Chamber  of Shipping in 1991 found that the gap
between demand for and supply of seafaring personnel may widen significantly  before the end of the
current decade.  Major efforts will be required to correct this situation because even in the populous
developing  countries  with substantial  unemployment  there has been little interest in seafaring  as a source
of income. Governments  in these  countries  have usually  given  little attention  to the employment  potential
of international  ocean transport, in spite of prospective  considerable  foreign exchange income through
remittances.  If developing  countries are to be counted on as the principal source of future supply of
seafaring  personnel,  then there will have  to be much  more emphasis  on improving  training arrangements.
The Philippines  are currently providing  16 percent of the crews in the world merchant  fleet, but a recent
investigation  revealed  that a very high portion  of Filipino  seafarers  did not possess  required qualifications.
C.  Ocean Transport  as a Threat to the Environment
56.  The grounding of the tanker 'Exxon Valdez' in Alaskan coastal waters caused a substantial oil
spill with devastating  impacts  on flora and fauna. Tanker accidents  happen all the time, and the total of
the associated  oil spills worldwide  exceeds  that of the accident  in Alaska manifold. But extensive  media
coverage  and the ensuing public outrage  caused  the 'Exxon Valdez' case to become the starting point for
new standards that apply to tanker design, operation, and their owners' liability.  Following  this event,
the U.S. Government  passed a law--the  Oil Pollution  Act (OPA) of 1990--which  holds tanker operators
fully liable for any damage  their vessels  may cause. OPA requires  also that any tanker which will operate
in U.S. territorial waters from the mid-1990s  onwards  has to be double-hulled. In the meantime, Canada
has adopted similar legislation,  and other countries  are expected  to follow. The oil tanker accidents  off-
shore northern Spain  and the Shetlands  in late 1992  can be expected  to generate  more reaction  along these
lines.  The EC is taking steps to regulate  technical standards  and to rigorously police the operation of
tankers in European coastal waters.  However, much of the debate over these issues lacks objectivity.
Double hulls are no guarantee for preventing oil spills.  It is rather vessel condition and operating
practices.  The Shetland accident was essentially  due to error of judgement, poorly trained crew, and
unjustifiably  premature abandoning  the tanker 'Braer'.  Even if this tanker would have been double-
hulled, the accident would have happened  under such circumstances.
57.  The present international  tanker fleet includes  very few units with double  hulls or which are built
according  to an equally acceptable  standard,  the mid-deck  design. Tankers built to this design standard
are equipped with a horizontal  separator of cargo holds that extends from bow to stern.  In the case of
hull damage the ambient  water pressure  exceeds  the pressure  of oil in the tanks and thus prevents  spillage
to occur.  However since the U.S. market is the principal attractor of world oil trades, a shortage  of
OPA-standard  tankers will curtail the movement  of oil, and thus render many non-conforming  tankers
with henceforth limited trading prospects.
58.  Mandating  the double  hull design for all tankers will necessarily  result  in the introduction  of void
spaces on a massive scale.  Double hull configurations  will require almost triple the steel surface to be
coated to protect against corrosion.  Routine inspection by crew members to guard against coating
breakdown  and corrosion, and related  maintenance  will be infinitely  more complex  and time consuming.
It is ironic that while the future outlook  for seafaring  personnel  has actually induced  vessel designs that- 31  -
It is ironic that while the future outlook for seafaring  personnel  has actually induced  vessel designs that
simplify and reduce labor intensive  maintenance,  the double hull design structures will demand vastly
increased  maintenance  to be performed  by higher  numbers  of personnel  and by a more skilled  labor force.
If this challenge  for the industry  is not positively  addressed  and resolved,  the safety risks become not only
obvious but ominous. A case in point is the tanker accident  off-shore northern Spain.  The vessel was
double-hulled  but suffered fatal damage  after hydrocarbon  vapor exploded  that had accumulated  in hull
spaces, without  having been detected by the crew.
59.  Since  tanker accidents  and related  oil spills have been  on the rise during recent years the question
of vessel condition  and maintenance  neglect  has been brought up again.  In many instances  vessels with
severe structural and mecbrnical deficiencies  have been encountered. Cargo owners and the maritiir
cormunity  are therefore pressing for stricter inspection standards to be applied by the international
classification societies, and for shorter intervals between such inspections. Until the mid-1980s there
were principally 11 members  of the International  Association  of Classification  Societies  that controlled
vessel inspection and the issuance  of seaworthiness  certificates. They were based in Western Europe,
the U.S.A., and Japan but had extensive networks  of representation  all over the world.  However since
then the number of such societies  has mushroomed  and now totals more than 50, of which the majority
have their base in developing countries.  The rules and enforcement  standards of many of the new
societies are lenient, and shipowners can easily switch to those societies which have a record of
willingness  to let questionable  tonnage  pass.  The proliferation  of classification  societies  and the intense
commercial competition among them have been blamed as key reasons for the loss in confidence in
classification  as a reliable indicator  of a vessel's condition. Too many incidents  were reported of ships
found to be in a poor condition with the classification  certificates  in order.
60.  A precarious tanker fleet and the requirements of unlimited liability under OPA and similar
legislation have induced the insurers another time to  review their practices and rates.  The U.K.
Protection  & Indemnity  Association  increased  its premiums  by 150  percent in mid 1992, and advised  that
another similar increase  may have to be applied within  the foreseeable  future. But in view of heavy cash
outlays to cover the cost of accidents, like that of the 'Exxon Valdez', and potential future claims that
may go into the billions of dollars many insurers have become wary of continued involvement  in the
shipping market.  A crisis is building  up.
VI.  CORRECTING  WORLD  MERCHANT  FLEET DEFICIENCIES
61.  During 1992, the average annual revenue earning performance of all ships in the world's
merchant  fleet was about  6.2 tons/dwt. Considering  a further growth in annual  seatrade volumes  to about
five billion tons by the end of the 1990s  and a gradual increase to 6.8 tons/dwt per year in the average
revenue earning performance  of all vessels in the international  ocean transport market, the fleet would
have to expand  from 657 million  dwt in late 1992  to about  735 million  dwt in aggregate  carrying capacity
in the year 2000.  It is unlikely  that greater productivity  gains could  be achieved  because the proportion
of older vessels in the world fleet can be expected  to remain relatively high during the current decade.
Older ships operate with comparatively  low speeds and are also prone to be out of commission  during
times of required frequent  repairs. Thus their revenue  earning  potential  is limited. In addition, there will- 32  -
be no quick end to the pervasive  problem of port congestion,  particularly  in developing  countries. Ships'
downtime in ports reduces their commercial  performance.
62.  On the other hand, the repair and insurance  cost of a substantial  portion  of the older tonnage can
be expected to increase so much that further trading will become commercially  prohibitive.  More
rigorous  inspection arrangements and  seaworthiness certification standards  by  the  international
classification  societies--in  response  to growing pressure by cargo owners and the maritime community--
are bound to exacerbate  these developments. This observation  applies to about 40 percent of the current
world fleet, particularly to pre-1975 built vessels. It is estimated  that during the next eight years about
260 million dwt of overaged and deficient  tonnage will have to be withdrawn from the market for good.
A high percentage of this tonnage will represent  tankers which do not comply with the environmental
protection  requirements  under OPA and similar rules.
A.  The Demand  for Newbuildings
63.  In view of the projected net increase  in carrying  capacity  of the world's merchant  fleet, and the
need to replace decommissioned  vessels, roughly 330 million dwt of new tonnage will have to be built
between 1993 and 2000.  A review of changes in the composition  of the international  merchant fleet
auring the last eight years provides indications  about differences  in the demand pattern for the various
categories  of cargo ships (see Table 7 on page 33).  In line with their preponderance  in the world's fleet
and the anticipated massive withdrawal of overaged and deficient vessels, the highest demand for
newbuildings  will be in the oil tanker and dry bulk carrier sectors.  However, it can be expected  that the
average size of new oil tankers and dry bulk carriers to be ordered  will differ from the carrying capacities
which were typical  of newbuildings  during the 1970s  and 80s. The new vessels will be smaller and with
built-in versatility to be able to carry different types of bulk cargo.  Both phenomena  will ensure more
operational  flexibility and enhanced  commercial  performance.
64.  In conformity with the projected  growth of gas, chemicals  and oil product trades, a substantial
demand for specialized  tankers is expected  to materialize. Since  the market is already relatively  saturated
with purpose-built  cellular container  vessels, and given the fact that the majority of these vessels is less
than ten years old, it is likely that the demand for newbuildings  in this vessel category will be modest.
On the other hand, there has been a renewed interest in general cargo ships whose share in the world
merchant has declined during recent years.  The new type of general cargo ship will, however, be
different from a traditional  vessel in this category.  The perceived  need for more operational  flexibility
and the implied  capacity  to carry different types of cargo, such as breakbulk  and containers,  on the same
voyage will lead to modern multi-purpose  vessels.  Port limitations in many developing  countries will
induce a trend whereby many  of these vessels  will be equipped  with highly  efficient  cargo handling  gear,
or be designed to RoRo configuration  which allows cargo loading and discharge over ship-integrated
ramps. Table 8 on page 34 provides further details on expected  demand for newbuildings  in the different
vessel categories.
65.  A market analysis by the Association  of West European  Shipbuilders  suggests  that the presently
installed  yard capacities for shipbuilding,  worldwide, are of the order of 18 inillion  compensated  gross
tons, which translates roughly into the ability to  build 27 million dwt of  new tonnage per  year.
Considering the projected pattern of demand for newbuildings  (see the annex on page 45), there is
sufficient capacity supply to meet such requirements in the near future.  After 1995, however, the- 33  -
demand-supply relations in the newbuilding  market can be expected to deteriorate, if no corrective
measures are taken.
Table 7:  THE INTERNATIONAL  COMMERCIALLY  OPERATED  FLEET
Changes  in Fleet Composition
Status In the mid 80s  Status in the early 90s
Vessel Category  Number  dwt  Share  Number  dwt  Share  Change
(mill.)  in Total  (mill.)  in Total  (in dwt)
dwt(%)  dwt(%)
Oil Tankers  5,723  240.7  39.3  5,962  256.1  39.8  6.4 %
Chemical Tankers  874  6.2  1.0  968  6.2  1.0  0
LNG/LPTolkers  755  10.3  1.7  802  11.0  1.7  6.8 %
Dry Bulk Carriers  4,595  183.9  30.0  4,660  199.7  31.1  8.6 %
O  O  QCriits  372  31.3  6.4  352  36.8  5.7  - 6.3 %
Container Vessels  1,027  21.1  3.4  1,189  27.0  4.2  27.9 %
Girenercatl  o Ships
t  (Sigleck  7,166  25.3  4.1  6,757  24.5  3.8  3.2  %
General Cargo Ships
(Multi Deck)  7,266  56.9  9.3  6,274  48.2  7.5  - 15.3 %
Reefer Ships  1,273  6.7  1.1  1,386  7.6  1.2  13.4 %
RoRo Vessels  960  7.7  1.3  1,022  8.2  i.3  6.5 %
Combined  go-
Pnesen,  - - - tii37--0  4.8  0.1  311  0.6  0.1  25 %
Source:  Insttute  of Shipping  Economics  and  Logistics.  'Statistical  Yearbook". Various  issues. Bremen
66.  As can be inferred from Table 9 on page 35, the bulk of shipbuilding  activities in recent years
took place in a limited number of countries. The twelve leading shipbuilding  nations presently control
over 90 percent of the market.  For many  years now, the Far Eastern  yards had the lion's share in these
activities, with Japan and South Korea in the lead.  The composition  of the leading shipbuilding  nations
has remained essentially unchanged since the early 1980s.  To maintain the market shares of their
shipyards in newbuilding  activities, the different countries  pursued a variety of strategies.  In addition
to subsidy schemes these strategies focused on yard industry restructuring.  Such restructuring led to
improved  productivity. The most notable result of the restructuring  measures  was the reduction  in labor
involved in shipbuilding.  Since 1975 the related work forces were reduced by 62 percent in WestK
European shipyards, and a staggering  73 percent in Japanese  yards.  Increased automation  of building,
activities, reinforced by computer-aided  techniques, allowed  the yards to cut cost and thus to maintain
their market shares.  But during the intervening  years of slackening  demand  for newbuildings,  the cost
pressures continued,  particularly in the Far Eastern and West European  yards.- 34  -
Table 8:  THE WORLD  MERCHANT  FLEET
Newbuilding  Requirements  for Principal  Tonnage  Categories
in million  dwt
Category  1992  - 1995  1996 - 2000
Oil Tankers  22  65
Specialized  Tankers
(Gas,  Chemical,  and  7  23
Product categories)
Dry Bulk Carriers
(incl.  Combination  44  86
Carriers )
Container  Vessels  8  7
General  Cargo Ships
( inct. RoRo tonnage)  5  24
Reefer Ships  2  3
Source:  Author's  estimate
67.  In the meantime,  however, several  countries  in the former socialist  block of Eastern Europe  have
been able to establish  firm market niches. Low wages and comparative  advantages  in other factor inputs
have enabled yards in these countries  to offer newbuilding  tonnage  at attractive  prices. China has been
another country that has been able to penetrate the shipbuilding  markets. Chinese-built  vessels have a
consistent record of high quality and reliability,  and are thus in demand.  But many Chinese yards are
still antiquated  and are in need of major improvements. Notwithstanding  the subsidy  issue, for many of
these developing  nations, engaging in shipbuilding  activities  has been beneficial. Since shipbuilding  is
an assembly industry, there are many forward and backward  linkages with other parts of the national
economies. A recent Bank survey'  which was addressing  options for the shipbuilding  industries  in the
FSU countries  concluded that for each one million  currency units of shipbuilding  contracts, 40 percent
would accrue to a yard and that the balance  of 60 percent would benefit national steel manufacturers,
equipment  suppliers, and others.
68.  During the remainder  of the 1990s,  several  changes  in shipbuilding  and individual  country shares
are likely to materialize.  The number of large and medium-size  shipyards will increase.  There are
presently  over 80 countries  engaged  in shipbuilding,  and yards in more than 60 percent of these countries
are capable of building vessels with carrying capacities  above 5,000 dwt.  The Far Eastern yards will
maintain their market dominance,  with Japan continuing  in the lead, if not with market shares sustained
during the 1970s  and 1980s. China can be expected  to expand its shares.  South Ko-ea's shipbuilding
industry will enter a stage of stabilization,  but is likely to defend  a market share of around 20 percent.
The West and Northern European shipyards with their superiority in the development  and building of
sophisticated  and specialized  tonnage  will  remain a market  force. Recent initiatives  by major shipbuilders
4  Peters, Hans  J.  1993.  "Waterborne  Transport  in the Russian  Federation  - Trends,  Issues, and Remedial  Options". Mimneo.
World  Bank, Washington,  D.C.- 35  -
in the region to jointly design and market standardized  high quality tonnage, like the E3  tanker,
demonstrate their deterninedness to stay in the market.  The E3 designation stands for European,
Environmental,  and Economical.
Table 9:  THE WORLD'S  LEADING SHIPBUILDING NATIONS
Ranking by Percentage Share in Tonnage on Order
1985  1988  1992
Japan  43.3 %  South  Korea  32.5 %  Japan  39.0 %
South Korea  19.0 %  Japan  25.8  %  South Korea  21.1  %
Brazil  6.1  %  Yugoslavia  5.0  %  Denmnark  5.4  %
Taiwan  3.5  %  Taiwan  3.9  %  China  5.1  %
China  3.4 %  Brazil  3.5 %  Taiwan  3.3  %
Germany  2.1  %  China  3.3 %  Romania  2.9  %
Poland  2.0  %  Germany  3.2  %  Brazil  2.7  %
Spain  2.0  %  Poland  3.1  %  Germany  2.4  %
Yugoslavia  1.9 %  Spain  3.1  %  Great Britain  2.4  %
Romania  1.7 %  Italy  2.7  %  Poland  2.3  %
Denmark  1.7 %  Romania  2.3  %  Spain  2.3  %
U.S.A.  1.5 %  Denmark  1.9  %  Croatia  2.1  %
All Others  11.8 %  All Others  9.7  %  All Others  9.0  %
Total Tonnage on Order
year-end records
1985:  46,696,555  dwt  1988:  38,536,093  dwt  1992:  68,672,316  dwt
Source: Fairplay. 'Newbuilding  Supplement".  Various issues. London
69.  The shipbuilding  industries  in the FSU and East European  countries, and their ability to attract
orders will remain an important factor in the shipbuilding  market during the remainder  of the 1990s.
Yet, while Poland and Romania  have  been able to establish  their yards firmly in the international  market,
there is much doubt regarding  yards in the different maritime  republics  of the FSU. Many of these yards
have b_en and remain engaged  in the construction  of naval vessels. The extent and pace in which such
naval yards can be converted to build merchant tonnage will determine these countries' prospects to
partake in  international shipbuilding activities.  The most cumbersome obstacle to  overcome are
centralized  and archaic management  organizations  which stand in the way towards required reforms.- 36  -
70.  In the Americas,  the formerly important  Brazilian  shipbuilding  industry is expected  to be unable
to make much headway  during the next ten years.  With its present limitations  as a shipbuilding  nation,
Brazil is likely to engage in building various types of vessels of less sophisticated  design for the home
market, and to a lesser extent for foreign customers. The U.S. plans for streamlining  the construction
of merchant  ships is slow in coming, and the national  yards are so burdened  with the excessive  cost of
factor inputs that it is very unlikely for a competitive  shipbuilding  industry to emerge in the foreseeable
future. Oceania and Africa  are still backward  shipbuilding  regions. No major advances  can be expected
to materialize there.  On the other hand, countries like India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Turkey are
considered  to become contenders  in the international  shipbuilding  market.
B.  The Demand  for Repair. Upgrading.  and Conversion
71.  While no more than 2,000 newbuildings  are likely to be delivered  from the world's shipyards in
any one year, in excess of 20,000 vessels  will probably  undergo  some type of formal repair. Ship repair
and shipbuilding are closely related industries, drawing on many of the same facilities, skills, and
resources. There are three basic divisions  to ship repair classification. Firstly, there is scheduled  repair,
which is centered around the main event--dry docking--and  accounts for about 75 percent of the total
workload. Secondly,  there is unscheduled  repair work, which is often damage related, or necessitated
by deteriorating  vessel  performance. And thirdly, there is ship conversion  which is the most specialized
and costly segment of the market.
72.  Due to the downturr.  in the international  seatrade  markets during the first half of the 1980s  and
the concomitant  reduction  in newbuilding  orders, only a limited  number  of new ships entered the market,
and the world merchant  fleet was aging rapidly. At the same time expenditures  on vessel maintenance
have been at minimal levels.  But as the market picked up again and freight rates started to rise, there
were not only positive indicators for repair demand but there was also a substantial accumulation  of
workload arising from years of neglect. Such demand is estimated to have risen by seven percent in
1987, and a further ten percent in 1988.  Since then the level of demand has remained  high, with the
exception  of a brief downturn in 1991.
73.  Several developments  during the 1980s  have had their influence  on ship repair activities and
reduced  the need for fixed installations,  such as dry docks. New technology  has enabled far more work
to be undertaken on vessels while they remain afloat, which has led to the growth of a  whole new
industry  of underwater  repair, often located  away from traditional  yard centers. At the same time there
has been an increase of repair on vessels while they remain in service.  In addition, advanced hull
coatings have enabled shipowners  to move to a five year dry docking  cycle.
74.  The ship repair industry had to internalize  financial  problems  in the early 1980s  in the same way
in which shipowners  had to cope with the consequences  of sluggish  seatrade markets. During the 1980s
a considerable  proportion  of repair activities  migrated  from Northern  Europe  and Japan to the lower cost
areas of Singapore, Southem Europe, the Far East, and the Middle  East, which caused major changes
in the structure of the repair market.  Between  1985  and 1990  the volume of repair work carried out in
Southeast  Asia, for instance, is estimated  to have nearly tripled.  Conversely, Northem Europe saw its
share in global repair activities  fall from nearly 35 percent to just above 20 percent.  Those yards that
have been able to attract repair business  benefitted  essentially  from two circumstances: low wage labor
and location. Repair facilities  which are situated  within the key seatrade lanes, like in Singapore,  have- 37  -
a major locational  advantage. But as the patterns of trade change yards may lose such advantage. The
most critical issues  in ship repair  pricing are the cost of labor, which generally  represent  about 70 percent
of a yard's total expenditure,  and the productivity  of that labor.  Developing  countries which consider
entering the ship repair business--in  the expectation  that rising labor cost in yards of the industrialized
countries may induce further shifts towards low wage countries--will  succeed only if high productivity
levels can be assured.
75.  If the 1990s  are to be the decade in which quality is to be restored  to a position  of pre-eminence
in shipping, then price will play a lesser role in determining repa,  workload distribution, whereas
technical  standards assume increasing  significance. All major ship repair regions can expect an incredse
in their total workload during the next five years, with the largest rises forecast for the countries of
Southeast  Asia.  But the extent to which this will materialize  will depend  on the availability  of sufficient
capacity  and labor.  Furthermore, the yards around the Arabian Gulf can expect to gain further market
shares.  The regions which are forecast to experience  more erosion of their market share are Southern
Europe and the Far East.
76.  In contrast  to ship repair, ship upgrading  and conversion  are concentrated  in a few leading  yards
which have developed  expertise and reputation  in particular  market niches. Contract values  are usually
high.  Unlike repair, much of the cost in upgrading and conversion activities is accounted for by
equipment, like a new main propulsion unit in re-engining, and materials, such as steel for vessel
lengthening.  With newbuilding  prices remaining  high and shipowners  seeking to take advantage of
improved trading prospects, the trend towards life extension  of existing tonnage is likely to continue,
which adds further impetus to ship upgrading  and conversion  demand.  A sobering dimension of this
demand is the fact that a total of some 3,500 high volume bulk carriers and tankers will face the third
or fourth special surveys  by the classification  societies  during the period 1993-96. There are indications
that many of these vessels may undergo conversion  during this process.  On the basis of a nominal
refurbishing  time of two months per vessel, this would imply an average requirement  of 120 berth per
year.  Taking the approximately  80 yards worldwide, capable  of upgrading and conversion work on
vessels  of this size, with an average  of 2.5 berths per yard, the maximum  capacity  is around 200 berths.
By implication, such type of vessel conversion  and classification  repair work alone could occupy on
average almost 60 percent of total available  yard capacity  for this market segment.
C.  The Demand  for Tonnage Demolition
77.  Shipbreaking  was attractive  during periods when steel pric-es  were high and scrap could be used
for quick conversion  into material for a variety of purposes, such as concrete reinforcing  bars.  A very
large crude carrier of about 200,000 dwt yields around 33,000 to 35,000 tons of steel scrap.  Countries
with limited or no indigenous  iron ore sources found scrapping  attractive  during times of rapid growth
and expanding  construction  activities. South Korea and Taiwan were prime examples. Both countries
are dynamic steel exporters but poorly endowed with domestic iron ore and coal deposits.  Hence, the
foreign exchange cost of purchasing  ships for scrapping  could be directly offset by reduced feedstock
imports  and steel export earnings. But shipbreaking  is very labor intensive,  and as wages increased and
the price of steel in the world market started to decline, these countries  withdrew from shipbreaking.
78.  Current shipbreaking activities are primarily concentrated  in South Asia, although China has
entered the market and holds prospects to expand  into these activities  much more rapidly than the other- 38  -
countries. For further details on countries  which are active in shipbreaking,  see Table 10 below. While
presently not involved in shipbreaking  activities, there are indications  that Vietnam  has much potential
to  become an active player in this field.  But in contrast to South Korea and Taiwan the present
shipbreaking regions all have sizeable  domestic ore or coal deposits and typically do not export steel.
Vessels  purchased for scrapping  are therefore a net drain on already slim foreign exchange reserves.
Table 10: ANALYSIS  OF VESSELS  BROKEN  UP IN 1992
Developing  Countries  are in the Lead
Total  Tankers  Dry Bulkers  Gen. Cargo  Ships
No.  dwt  ;Z.  dwt  No.  dwt  No.  dwt
('000)  ('000)  ('000)  ('000)
China  36  3,187  15  2,442  12  666  9  79
India  109  2,733  32  1,528  13  420  64  785
Bangladesh  34  1,727  12  1,370  3  113  19  243
Pakistan  20  1,715  13  1,472  4  214  3  29
Turkey  7  185  2  106  2  41  3  38
Thailand  1  15  --  --  --  --  1  15
Mexico  1  13  *-  - 1  13
Spain  2  5  --  --  --  --  2  5
Pe  3  1  3
Greece  1  3  --  --  --  - 1  3
Por*ugal  1  2  1  - --  1  2
Denmark  2  2  --  --  --  --  2  2
Japan  2  1  - --  2  1
Netherlands  I  I  --  --  --  --  I  I
Gernany  1  1  - - *  I
United Kingdom  I  I  - *  *  I  I
TToAL  |  220  9,593  74  6,919  34  1,453  112  1,221
Source: Lloyd's  Shipping  Economist. Research  files.  London
79.  The projected  annual demand  for tonnage  demolition  is expected  to amount  tc 26 million dwt in
1993 and to increase to 38 million  dwt annually towards the end of the current decade.  The act.dlly
scrapped tonnage was barely ten  million dwt in 1992  and much less during the preceding three years.
There are two factors accounting  for this discrepancy. One is low productivity  in those countries were
ship scrapping  currently takes  place. At the extreme  was a West African  nation  where it took 26 months
to break a medium-size  bulk carrier. Taiwanese  breakers  used to accomplish  the same task in under four
weeks. But the productivity  rates in all other countries  are also three to four times lower than those that- 39  -
were achieved in South Korea and Taiwan when yards in both nations  were still active in this field.  At
present only shipbreaking  yards in Turkey operate at comparable  levels  of efficiency.
80.  Most disruptive, however, is the shortage  of capital.  Breakers  in developing  countries have to
buy the tonnage to be scrapped  from international  shipowners. And they have to pay in hard currency.
Their access to foreign exchange is curtailed  because the national  governments  have other priorities for
their limited  capital resources  and commercial  banks have  usually  considered  these activities  as too risky.
And thus a dilemma has developed: there is much need for shipbreaking  but no cash to do it.  In the
absence of efficient and reliable scrapping arrangements,  tonnage supply in the international ocean
transport market will remain heavily inflated.  The financial performance  of carriers will deteriorate
further, and deficient  vessels will continue  to trade with the result that the annual incidence  of accidents
is likely to  increase dramatically.  If no remedy can be found, the crisis in the international  ocean
transport industry will intensify.
VII.  THE FINANCING  DILEMMA
81.  Addressing  the projected demand for newbuildings,  ship maintenance,  repair, and conversion,
and tonnage demolition  will be costly.  It is estimated that the cumulative  cost of these three activities
during the next eight years will amount to almost US$ 400 billion in constant 1992  prices, increasing
from US$ 43.5 billion in 1993 to US$ 63.7 billion in 2000.  Shipbuilding  will require the lion's share,
representing  about US$ 330 billion, followed  by maintenance,  repair, and conversion  (US$ 51.7 billion),
and then demolition (US$ 10.5 billion). Details about the underlying  assumptions  and of the expected
annual cost streams  are given in the annex on page 45.
82.  As regards newbuilding,  maintenance,  repair, and conversion,  the key question is whether the
international  ocean transport  industry will be able to mobilize such considerable  sums.  The first point
to note is that the scale  of collapse in freight  earnings  and vessel asset prices in the space  of a few months
during 1992--and as experienced during numerous preceding market cycles--represents  a degree of
volatility which is hard to imagine in any other industry. The effects  of the 1992 market downturn on
ocean transport companies'  profitability  underline  just how important  it is for shipowners  to be able to
read the tendency  of cycles and de-gear, either through building  up cash balances  or reducing  debt, when
entering a downward  phase.  But it continues  to be surprising  how few carriers appeared to be able to
achieve this.
83.  All too often shipowners  have fallen into the trap of increasing  their capital expenditure  when
freight markets where expanding,  on the assumption  that the net proceeds  of ship sales would ensure the
maintenance  of adequate  liquid  balances. In practice, however,  falling  second-hand  prices generally  result
in such owners becoming  dangerously  overstretched  during subsequent  downcycles. The current phase
of the cycle, in which the squeeze on operating margins is exacerbated  by sharply rising repair and
insurance  cost, is proving most punishing  for owners who made this mistake. As a result, the liquidity
of many carriers is very poor.
84.  Ever since moving away from total self-financing  in the 1960s,  the ocean transport industry has
overwhehningly  relied on mortgage loans from commercial  banks for the financing  of ship acquisitions.- 40  -
However, over the past three years, the banks' appetite  for ship finance has been tempered by fears of
debt-financed  expansion. There are relatively few commercial  banks which specialize in ship finance,
probably  not exceeding  one hundred. Their present portfolio  to shipping is estimated  to be of the order
of US$ 75 billion.  Several of these banks had to internalize  huge ship loan losses and are therefore
reluctant to further engage in asset-secured  lending  for vessel acquisition.
85.  Capital adequacy  is another factor which will influence  the extent to which banks will be able to
provide funds for ship financing.  Reference is made to the Basle Convergence Ratio which will be
applied to all international  banks from 1993  onwards, and will as such have substantial  implications  for
the way in which banks will conduct their lending  business  in future. The Basle  regulations reduce the
gearing ability of the banks which means that the margins on loans will need to increase. Shipping  will
have to compete  for resources which will become scarcer in the medium term.  Capital adequacy is a
problem and will result in banks having to be more discerning in the amounts they lend.  For ocean
transport industry borrowers it also  means that their equity contributions will have to  increase
substantially.
86.  There are differences between liner business  and bulk shipping that are significant  for the way
in which the two sectors of the industry are financed.  Tankers and dry bulk ships are appraised as
individual  units, whereas in liner shipping a vessel is considered  as part of an international  transport
structure. Bank lending  for ships to be used in liner trades therefore tends  to be corporate finance  which
is based on earning multiples  and the overall worth of the business. From a banking  perspective  a good
liner company represents a strong corporate profile with a prospect of steady vessel revenues.  The
emphasis  is on fleet continuity,  so that the ship is essentially  a unit of transport, and not primarily  bought
and sold for asset play  profits,  which characterizes the investment behavior of many bulk operators.
87.  Lending for  individual bulk carriers is more risky because their asset values and earning
performance  are very vulnerable  to cyclical  market  swings. The fact that many  of such vessels  serve only
one cargo owner increases their vulnerability. With soft markets likely to persist in the short term and
operating  cost pressure unlikely  to ease, the squeeze  on the profitability  of bulk shipping  companies  will
intensify. All these circumstances  have led banks to take a much more cautious view when it comes to
asset-secured  lending for tanker or dry bulk vessel acquisition. Since  most of the projected  demand for
newbuildings  relates to these ship types, this development  is cause for particular concern in that the
availability  of traditional funding  can be expected  to become  very limited.
88.  Aggravating this situation is the fact that the provisions under OPA and similar regulations
regarding pollution liability have become major deterrents for banks to be  further involved in the
financing  of tanker acquisitions.  At issue are the rapidly  increasing  cost of securing  ship mortgages  under
the Mortgage  Additional  Perils Insurance  which was established  to cover financiers' risks resulting  from
the U.S. oil pollution  legislation. Owing  to these  circumstances,  ship loans  may become  unprofitable  for
banks if the cost of insuring ship mortgages  rise much more.  The worst case scenario for bankers is a
vessel which had an accident  in U.S. waters and was then arrested because  the operator could not meet
damage claims through insurance  or other sources.  The mortgagee  could thus lose the security on the
loan:  the ship.
89.  In order to meet their financial  needs, shipowners  have tested possible  alternatives  to mortgage-
type lending by  commercial banks.  In  some countries, like Denmark, Germany, and  Norway,
considerable amounts of private capital have been mobilized since the 1960s through the tax-driven- 41  -
limited partnership markets.  But these sources have contracted as the commercial  performance and
prospects for ocean transport  deteriorated. In a number  of cases, owners  have  also benefitted  handsomely
from different forms of  financial assistance to  the ocean transport industry through construction,
operating, and credit subsidies  which were provided  by several  governments. However, there are now
concerted efforts which are spearheaded  by the OECD and the EC to gradually dismantle  such subsidy
schemes.
90.  Under pressure from its underemployed  shipbuilding  industry the U.S. Government  has started
to take the firmest stance as regards subsidies  to the ocean  transport industry. Rigltly or wrongly, the
view is taken that U.S. yards are disadvantaged  through unfair  competition  from foreign  shipbuilders  who
enjoy financial  support from their governments  and are thus able to undercut  prices.  A conflict  appears
inevitable  in view of the fact that the U.S. Government  is contemplating  legislation--the  proposed  Gibbons
Bill--which  would provide for penalties to be levied on ships built with subsidies, which call on U.S.
ports. In summary,  the current background  to the provision  of newbuilding  credit and subsidies  suggests
that conditions  will become tighter during the coming  years.
91.  Most financial  institutions  that are willing  to further engage in ocean transport industry related
lending consider cashflow-based  lending as the most stable--and  secure--form  of funding and as the
potent.ally  most effective  instrument  to hedge  against the cyclical  pattern of demand  for ocean transport.
The level of such type of lending is tailored to the projected  earning capacity of a vessel, which means
that shipping  revenues  cover operating  eynenses  and capital  cost. Banks  which  have  adopted  such lendilng
policy now require that the financial  package be carefully  structured  to suit vessel employment,  so that
debt can be serviced without  causing  undue stress to either borrower or lender.  To ensure this, lenders
increasingly  insist on secure long-term  charters as a guarantee  of regular vessel earnings  to meet the debt
service.
92.  These developments  might be considered  as harbinger  of a new order in ocean transport. At the
core of this observation  are the shipper-carrier  relations. In order to gain access to the capital markets
for both investment  and long-term  debt, the ocean transport industry will need to establish  more lasting
relationships  between owners, operators, and cargo interests. It will not be the spot charter market or
second-hand  ship values that support the investments  in new ships, but renewed  long-term contractual
relationships  between the owners of the cargo and tomorrow's shipowners. Cargo owners should be
prepared to work in cooperation  with shipowners  and operators  in establishing  long-term  stability in the
cost of seaborne  transportation. In practice, however, there does not seem to be any rush on the part of
most cargo owners  to make such arrangements. Freight  markets  remain  dominated  by short-term  charters
and decision-making  which is essentially  based on the cheapest  transportation  cost, regardless  of quality.
But is precisely this situation which has generated  so much deterioration in the quality of service, the
safety record, and the financial  performance  of the ocean transport industry.
93.  The cargo owners' hesitance  can be explained  by a number of factors.  Firstly, many of them
sustained heavy losses in the 1980s on long-term charters contracted in the 1970s.  Secondly, there
remains the readiness  of many independent  owners to order ships speculatively,  and they are willing to
contract cargo for ocean transport under any circumstances. Thirdly, there is the inability of most
shippers to plan for their long-term requirements  in a way that they used to do in the 1960s  and early
1970s.  The structure and composition  of the international  seatrade markets, and related development
trends have become very different from the situation that characterized  these markets during the first- 42  -
decades after World War II.  The high degree of volatility that characterizes  contemporary  seatrade
markets makes cargo flow projections  difficult.
94.  Notwithstanding  their hesitance,  the cargo owners' need for reliable, flexible,  and cost-effective
transportation  could best be matched with the shipowners' requirement  for sufficient remuneration  to
compensate  for the risk they are taking through a readiness by both sides to enter into longer term
transportation  contracts.  Such contracts should be based on mutually  agreed freight levels and extend
over a substantial  period, with a duration in some cases of up to eight or ten years.  Only within such
a stable framework, in which operating flexibility  can still be maintained,  one can see a possibility to
establish orderly ship  replacement programs and  develop consistent relationships with  financing
institutions.
95.  One promising  area in which new tonnage  financing  might progress  further in the next few years
is that of leasing.  Lease financing  has been employed  by the ocean transport industry for decades, but
it has so far failed to dislodge the ship mortgage loan as the principal  mode of finance. This situation
is somewhat  surprising  in view of the fact that leasing  is quite prevalent  in the multi-billion  dollar aviation
sector and the potential for leasing structures to channel long-term funds into the financing of ships.
During the heyday of aircraft financing, shipowners  looked with envy on the amounts of capital which
were raised without apparent difficulties  to finance the construction  of new aircraft.  The most striking
feature during this period was the massive  growth which took place in aircraft leasing, and the rapid
expansion  of the specialist  aircraft leasing companies. Why was it not possible for the ocean transport
industry to attract this type of financing  on the same scale?  The answer is fairly straightforward.
Shipping is much more heterogenous,  with much less standardization  of asset design and employment.
Aviation is dominated by national carriers and by a relatively small number of large manufacturing
companies, whereas ocean transport  is not.  Passenger  growth projections  for the aviation  industry were
buoyant  but forecasts  of consistent  growth in the seatrade  markets  lacked  credibility. The operating  lease-
-as opposed to the finance or capital lease--has  been the vehicle through which enormous amounts of
money have been mobilized for aircraft financing, and it is the form of leasing which has the most
obvious  application  to shipping. The bareboat  charter of vessels incorporates  the basic characteristics  of
an operating lease.
96.  Given the history of the ocean transport  industry  over the past two decades, it is hardly surprising
that a tension  should  have  built up between  shipowners'  requirements--essentially  consisting  of longer  loan
periods and easy start terms--and  those of their bankers, who want to recover as much  principal as they
can as quickly as possible.  Lease financing, offering level rental payments over an extended period,
would seem to give shipowners  exactly what they need, while requiring no technical innovation  on the
part of the financing institutions. It is therefore perplexing  that it has not become more widely used.
97.  There are in fact a number  of obstacles  which have prevented  the increased  use of leasing  in ship
finance, some of which may now be losing importance,  while others are more fundamental. From the
shipowner's standpoint,  by far the most serious objection  has been the loss of flexibility  when it comes
to selling a leased vessel. This objection  has gained in force as operating  earnings  have steadily formed
a smaller and smaller proportion  of the total investment  return which shipowners  expect when buying a
vessel.  Particularly during more recent years, the prevalence of the asset play approach to  ship
investment,  in which high internal rates of return were sought and frecuently  obtained from the highly
geared acquisition  and quick resale of second-hand  ships, made the thought  of being locked into a long-
term lease contract an anathema  to many ship operators. However, now that the potential for realizing- 43  -
high capital profits from ship investment  has abated, and the risk of realizing substantial  capital losses
has once again become a material consideration,  one can assume that many owners will be much more
prepared to consider  the advantages  of leasing. This may take the form of selling  their vessels to other
owners and bareboat charter them back, or  through entering into operating leases with financing
institutions.
98.  Should leasing become more prevalent in the ocean transport industry, it would imply that the
ownership  of vessel assets  would  be increasingly  in the hands of financing  institutions,  and ocean  carriers
would no more than operate these assets. However  it is as yet unclear where such amassing  of ownership
would take place. One can assume  that the traditional  ship mortgage  banks would  show little predilection
to get involved on a major scale.  Some first indications  seem to point more into the direction  of long-
term investment  institutions,  such as pension funds and insurance  companies. Japanese trading house
have also shown interest. And there are some financial  organizations  of the large international  industry
groupings, like the General Electric Capital Corporation  (GECC), which have started to look into ship
leasing.  GECC has recently formed the First International Leasing Corporation  which is intended to
specialize in the ocean transport market.  But overall there is not yet a dependable  network of leasing
organizations  available  to ship operators  at a scale that is comparable  with the aviation  industry.
99.  The lack of effective financing  arrangements  for the acquisition  of tonnage to be scrapped is
equally disconcerting.  At the same time there are at present no indications  that sufficient funds will be
available in the immediate  future for required investments  in modern demolition facilities which will
ensure high productivity  rates. While shipbreaking  will remain a labor-intensive  activity,  the sheer extent
of volume increases in the tonnage to be scrapped--which  is expected  to reach levels four times higher
than at present--will necessitate  the introduction  of more mechanized  and also automated  processes.  If
the achievement  of such prerequisites  is left to the few fledgling  demolition  yards that presently  exist in
a limited number of developing  countries, there is little hope for major improvements  in shipbreaking
capacities and output.  The fact that the governments  of these countries  have shown little inclination  to
provide  the funds for required investments  in breaking  facilities, not to mention  foreign exchange  which
is needed to acquire tonnage  to be scrapped,  aggravates  this situation.
100.  Since the prospects for steel prices during the next few years are rather bleak, the financial
justification of investments  in shipbreaking  facilities is by implication  questionable. Thus it is highly
unlikely  that commercial  banks could  be enticed  to provide  the required  funds. But in some of the OECD
maritime nations the aggregate number of obsolete vessels has reached such proportions that resident
shipowners  have started to seek out collective  options for scrapping. Japan is a case in point.  Japanese
shipowners  have combined  to negotiate  vessel demolition  in South Asian  countries--especially  India--and
in the Philippines. Under such arrangements  the Japanese  clients would  pre-finance  the cost of breaking
facility  development  in these  countries,  and provide  technical  assistance  during the start-up  phase. While
this approach--if  it materializes--will  help to mitigate  the financing  dilemma  in ship breaking, it will not
be enough to overcome the discrepancy  between  demand and supply.  A concerted international  effort
is required to tackle the issue.  The London-based  International  Maritime  Industries Forum has tried to
rally support from diverse industry-related  groupings,  but so far without  notable success.
101.  Finally there is the issue  of required  capacity  expansions  in the shipbuilding  industry. As regards
ship maintenance,  repair, and conversion  there is not much need  for major investments  in new facilities.
Since the key shipbuilders  are located  in the industrialized  economies,  it can be safely assumed  that their
expansion  requirements  could  be met through  resource  mobilization  in the domestic  capital  markets. The- 44  -
scale of projected demand for  newbuildings  can be expected to  attract venture capital, and even
investments  in aspiring yards in some developing countries are likely to be justifiable, provided that
convincing corporate management strategies are adopted.  Overall, however, the aggregate capital
requirements  of the international  ocean transport industry  during the next eight years are presently far
from secured. There are at the moment  no effective  arrangements  to correct this situation. In fact, there
are more doubts  than assurances  hanging  over the industry  and the markets  it serves. Therefore the crisis
has become real.
VIII.  CONCLUDING  OBSERVATIONS
102.  The international  ocean  transport  industry  has drifted into a serious  crisis.  The industry endured
precarious situations in the past but the makings and scale of the current situation have no precedent.
Too many  adverse  developments--in  the trade, financial,  and insurance  markets, as well  as in international
legislation--have  materialized during recent years.  Their combined effects on the industry are far-
reaching.  If it can be fairly admitted  that some of these developments  were beyond the control of the
industry, the point has nevertheless  to be made that much  of what has led to the crisis was self-afflicted.
It  is now just  a question as to  when the bubble will burst.  At that point a  large portion of the
international merchant fleet will be  unfit for transport.  The implications for world trade will be
devastating.
103.  If such development  is to be avoided, the international  ocean transport industry will have to
undergo a major realignment.  Such process will not come easy as so many parties with different
commercial  objectives  and practices  are involved. State intervention  will complicate  this situation  even
further. Ways have to be found  which will be conducive  to instituting  required  adjustments. Despite  the
proliferation of diverse industry associations, these have not been able to develop consensus about
necessary  actions. The international  bodies  that have been  set up to enforce industry  standards  and safety
regulations-like the International Maritime Organization--have  not been successful in fulfilling their
mandates  satisfactorily. Their standing  and enforcement  capabilities  will have to be enhanced through
coercive  measures  to be agreed upon by appropriate  international  fora.
104.  There can be no doubt that ocean  transport  will become  more costly, once the required technical
standards  and safety rules are fully enforced. The short-term  gains to cargo owners which materialized
through uncontrolled  competition  among shipowners  are becoming largely offset by increasing freight
losses, the growing unreliability  of services,  and rising insurance  cost.  The tragedy of many lives lost
at sea aggravates these circumstances  only further.  In the end everybody  will suffer from the crisis in
international  ocean transport, if no corrective  measures  are taken.
105.  For the required industry realignment  to succeed there has to be full cooperation  between ship
operators  and cargo owners. Both parties have to show willingness  to form alliances  under which cargo
volumes  and transport  capacities  are teamed  up for long periods and under predictable  conditions. While
such arrangements  may deprive cargo owners from the short-term  benefits  of the spot market, they will
gain in the longer  run through reliable  and safe ocean  transport. If both parties can find ways to achieve
such cooperation,  it can be expected  that the cost of ocean transport will ultimately  decline again after
the questionable  tonnage  has been eliminated  from the market and thus the risk of insuring and financing
industry  assets has abated.- 45  -
ANErX
TE  INTERNATIONAL  OCEAN  TRANSPORT  INDUSTRY  IN CRISIS
Assessing the Reasons and Outlook
Expected  Demand for Shipbuilding,  Tonnage Demolition,  and Vessel Repair and Conversion
during the Period  1993 - 2000
Underlying  Assumptions
A.  WORLD MERCHANT  FLEET CAPACITY  REQUIREMENTS
Year  Seatrade  Volume  Revenue  Earning Performance  Total Tonnage  Reguired
(in  billion tons)  (tons/dwt, on average)  (in  million  dwt)
Actual
1990  4.00  6.08  658
1991  4.05  6.02  673
1992  4.10  6.24  657
Projected
1993  4.17  6.25  667
1994  4.25  6.32  672
1995  4.33  6.40  677
1996  4.42  6.50  680
1997  4.52  6.62  683
1998  4.66  6.75  690
1999  4.81  6.80  707
2000  5.00  6.80  735
The required  Net Addition  to the World Merchant  Fleet
between 1993 and 2000 is 68 million  dwt.
Note:  The projected  improvements  in average revenue  earning performance  are expected  to materialize
due to (a) a gradual reduction in the number  of slow  steaming  and repair-intensive  vessels which will be
scrapped, (b) the conversion and technological  upgrading of another substantial portion of existing
tonnage which will lead to  inproved operating performance, and  (c) the gradual introduction of
newbuildings,  which are expected  to represent over 40 percent of the world merchant  fleet by the year
2000.  Finally, the port reforn  programs which are being instituted  in a growing number of countries
worldwide  are likely to lead to reductions  in the number of days that vessels  have to spend to load and
unload cargo in ports, thus increasing  their commercial  performance.- 46  -
B.  EXPECTED  ANNUAL  VESSEL  SALES  FOR DEMOLITION
Year  Tonnage Sold












The Total Tonnage  expected  to be sold for Demolition
between 1993 and 2000 is 262 million dwt.
Note:  (1)  The total annual volume of tonnage actually scrapped--as  opposed to tonnage sold for
scrapping--was  4.1 million dwt in 1989, 2.6 million dwt in 1990, 4.8 million dwt in  1991, and 9.6
million dwt in  1992.  (2) The forecast increase in annual tonnage sold for scrapping is expected to
materialize because of  growing incidence of structural/mechanical  deficiencies at the  level of the
individual  overaged ship.  The costs to remedy these deficiencies, limited earning prospects for such
vessels during their remaining life cycle, higher insurance  premia, and more rigorous stances by the
classification  societies, can all be expected  to combine  as forceful  inducements  to scrap.
C.  NEWBUILDING  REQUIREMENTS  DURING  THE PERIOD 1993  TO 2000
Two factors apply: (1) net addition and (2) replacement  of scrapped  tonnage. The expected  net
addition is 68 million  dwt, and the projected  vessel retirement is 262 million dwt.  Thus, the estimated
volume of newbuildings  will be of the order of 330 million  dwt.
The required  Average  Annual  Output of Newbuildings
between 1993 and 2000 will be 41.25 million dwt.
Note: Actual  newbuilding  deliveries  worldwide  were 19.9 million  dwt in 1989,  24.3 million  dwt in 1990,
and 24.7 million dwt in 1991.  The estimated  existing intemational  newbuilding  yard capacity is 17.7
million  compensated  gross tons (cgt), which translates roughly into an equivalent  of 27 million  dwt.- 47  -
D.  EXPECTED DEMAND  FOR VESSEL  REPAIR  AND CONVERSION
The industry measures ship repair/conversion  demand and output through a workload index,
which is referred to as 'standard man-years' (SMY). In 1989, the estimated  global labor input to ship
repair and conversion  work was 137,850  SMY, up from 117,140  SMY in 1985. The projected  workload
in the international  conversion/repair  industry is as follows:
1985  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
100  118  123  124  128  125  122  118  117  116
1985 =  100)
Note: It is assumed that the level of demand for repair and conversion  work will taper off towards the
end of the current decade, as the world merchant  fleet is gradually  rejuvenating,  and older tonnage with
high maintenance  intensity  is successively  withdrawn  from the market.
E.  THE ESTIMATED  COST OF PROJECTED  SHIPBUILDING,  TONNAGE  DEMOLITION,
AND VESSEL  REPAIR  & CONVERSION
I.  ShipbuildinR
Average  newbuilding  prices in late 1992  were as follows:
Container Vessels  US$ 1,750/dwt
Dry Bulk Ships  US$  500/dwt
Gas Carriers  US$ 1,500/dwt
Oil Tankers  US$  600/dwt
General Cargo Ships  US$ 1,600/dwt
RORO Vessels  US$ 2,500/dwt
Note:  (1) Considering  the composition  of new tonnage  that was delivered, it has been assumed that the
weighted average  unit price for a newbuilding  in 1992  was US$  1,OOO/dwt.  (2) A total of 330 million
dwt of new tonnage is forecast to be ordered  during the period between 1993  and 2000.
The estimated Total Cost (in constant 1992 prices) of the implied  Shipbuilding  Program
v/ill be US$ 330 billion.- 48  -
II.  Tonnage  Demolition
The average price paid in late 1992 for vessels  to be scrapped  was US$ 140/ldt. This indicator
was roughly equivalent  to US$ 32/dwt in the case of tankers  and dry bulk carriers, and US$ 85/dwt for
general cargo ships.
Note:  (1) Considering  the composition  of tonnage that was scrapped  (in which dry bulkers and tankers
represented  the main portion), it has been  assumed  that the weighted  average  unit  price paid during 1992
for the acquisition  of tonnage  to be scrapped  was US$  40/dwt. (2) A total of 262 million  dwt of existing
tonnage is forecast to be sold to demolition  yards during the period between 1993  and 2000.
The estimated Total Cost (in constant 1992 prices)  of the implied Demoliffon  Program
wili be USS 10.48 billion.
III.  Vessel ReDair  & Conversion
At the beginning  of the 1990s,  the average  value of conversion  work was US$ 10.6 million/ship.
The average annual ship repair and maintenance  costs were:
Reefer Ships  US$ 515,000
Oil Tankers  US$ 487,000
Container Vessels  US$ 338,000
Dry Bulk Carriers  US$ 297,000
RoRo Vessels  US$ 280,000
General Cargo Ships  US$ 174,000
Note:  (1) In 1989  the actual  global ship repair and conversion  revenues  were US$ 6.108 billion, which
are estimated  to have increased  to US$ 6.270 billion in 1992.  (2) The progression in annual revenues
(as a proxy for estimated cost) is expected  to develop in tandem with the projected workload indices,
which implies that
the estimated Total Cost (in constant 1992 prices)  of Vessel Repair & Conversion
during  the period between 1993 and 2000 will be US$ 51.70 billion.- 49  -
F.  SUMMARY  OF FORECAST  CASHFLOWS  FOR SHIPBUILDING,
TONNAGE  DEMOLITION,  VESSEL  REPAIR AND CONVERSION
(all  indications  are in billion US$, in constant 1992  prices)
Year  |  Shipbuilding  Tonnage  Repair and  |  ANAUAL
I  |  Demolition  Conversion  TOTALS
1993  36.000  1.040  6.536  43.476
1994  33.000  1.120  6.587  40.707
1995  35.000  1.200  6.801  43.001
1996  35.000  1.280  6.642  42.922
1997  37.000  1.360  6.483  44.843
1998  43.000  1.440  6.270  50. 710
1999  55.000  1.520  6.217  62.737
2000  56.000  1.520  6.164  63.684
GRAND
TOTAL  330.000  10.480  51.700  392.100-Policy Research  Working Paper Series
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